Stumbled across these two papers early this morning. A quick perusal prompted me to post these.
1) Responding to a Groundwater Crisis: The Effects of Self-Imposed Economic Incentives by Steven M. Smith, Krister Andersson, Kelsey C. Cody, Michael Cox and Darren Ficklin.
Abstract: Many globally important groundwater aquifers are under considerable stress as withdrawals, predominantly for irrigation, outpace recharge. Meanwhile, groundwater policy to address the common-pool resource losses remains in its nascent stage. This study analyzes a recent and unique bottom-up effort to self-impose a groundwater pumping fee in San Luis Valley, Colorado. Utilizing a difference-in-difference econometric framework, our results bring new and direct empirical evidence to the debate on the use of economic incentives in groundwater policy. We find that the price- intervention has been effective; leading to a 33-percent reduction in groundwater use, predominantly through reduced irrigation intensity. We also find, to a more limited extent, movement away from water-thirsty crops and reduced overall irrigated acreage. Given that financial incentives can produce substantial conservation within a groundwater commons in duress, price-based policies warrant further consideration as irrigators address diminishing and variable water supplies.
2) Emergence of Collective Action in a Groundwater Commons: Irrigators in the San Luis Valley of Colorado by Kelsey C Cody, Steven M Smith, Michael Cox, Krister Andersson.
Download Emergence_Collective Action_GW_SLV
Abstract: Under what conditions are irrigators able to develop adaptive governance arrangements? This paper addresses this question by developing an empirically-grounded theory of self-governance of a snowmelt commons in Southern Colorado. Drawing on previous work in collective action and institutional theory, we argue that self-regulation of the hydro-commons is driven by changes in shared user perceptions with regards to the salience and scarcity of the resource, as well as the perceived probability of salvaging the resource system. We further posit that several conditioning factors affect the likelihood of effective local responses, including the existing institutional arrangements for self-governance, techno-institutional complementarities, and vested interests. We test and refine our theoretical argument by conducting a historical analysis of regional responses to hydrologic, social, and institutional disturbances in Colorado’s San Luis Valley.
Enjoy!
"Sooner or later, wittingly or unwittingly, we must pay for every intrusion on the natural environment." - Barry Commoner
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