WaterWired

CRS Report: 'Terrorism and Security Issues Facing the Water Infrastructure Sector'; Weaponizing Groundwater Redux, More!

Claudia Copeland wrote this CRS report almost nine years ago (15 December 2010): Terrorism and Security Issues Facing the Water Infrastructure Sector.

I am surprised that this report has (apparently) not been updated; a search did not produce anything with a title similar to this one.  

Download CRS_Terrorism_Water_Infrastructure_15Dec2010

Summary
Damage to or destruction of the nation’s water supply and water quality infrastructure by terrorist attack or natural disaster could disrupt the delivery of vital human services in this country, threatening public health and the environment, or possibly causing loss of life. Interest in such problems has increased greatly since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States.

Across the country, water infrastructure systems extend over vast areas, and ownership and
operation responsibility are both public and private, but are overwhelmingly non-federal. Since 
the attacks, federal dam operators and local water and wastewater utilities have been under
heightened security conditions and are evaluating security plans and measures. There are no
federal standards or agreed-upon industry practices within the water infrastructure sector to
govern readiness, response to security incidents, and recovery. Efforts to develop protocols and
tools are ongoing since the 9/11 terrorist attacks. This report presents an overview of this large
and diverse sector, describes security-related actions by the government and private sector since
9/11, and discusses additional policy issues and responses, including congressional interest.

Policymakers have been considering a number of initiatives, including enhanced physical
security, better communication and coordination, and research. A key issue is how additional
protections and resources directed at public and private sector priorities will be funded. In
response, Congress has provided $923 million in appropriations for security at water
infrastructure facilities (to assess and protect federal facilities and support security assessment
and risk reduction activities by non-federal facilities) and passed a bill requiring drinking water
utilities to conduct security vulnerability assessments (P.L. 107-188). When Congress created the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2002 (P.L. 107-297), it gave DHS responsibilities to
coordinate information to secure the nation’s critical infrastructure, including the water sector.
Under Homeland Security Presidential Directive-7, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
is the lead federal agency for protecting drinking water and wastewater utility systems.

 

Recent congressional interest has focused on two legislative issues: (1) security of wastewater
utilities, and (2) whether to include water utilities in chemical plant security regulations
implemented by DHS. In the 109th Congress, a Senate committee approved legislation to
encourage wastewater treatment works to conduct vulnerability assessments and develop site
security plans. Similar legislation was introduced in the 111th Congress (H.R. 2883). Congress
also turned attention to legislation to extend DHS’s Chemical Facilities Anti-Terrorism Standards
and, as part of that debate, whether to preserve an existing exemption for water utilities from
chemical facility standards or to include them in the scope of DHS security rules. The House
passed H.R. 2868 in November 2009, with a provision to require water utilities to use safer
chemicals and technology, but the Senate did not act on that bill or a companion Senate measure,
S. 3598.

Here is an excellent 2006 article by Peter Gleick on Water and Terrorism:

Download GleickWaterTerrorism06

Not sure what prompted me to ferret out this CRS report but I do harbor an interest in terrorist attacks on water infrastructure or the use of water as an agent of terrorism (see this post from 7 January 2007, my second WaterWired post. There does not seem to be much written on the weaponization of groundwater. Here is something I wrote in 2005 that can be found in the aforementioned post:

  Download Weaponization_and_Groundwater_4282005

Here is what I wrote 12 years ago:

Most of the concern for water terrorism has rightly emphasized the protection of water intakes and other entry points into water distribution systems and the development of emergency supplies and response procedures.  The contamination of reservoirs is generally considered difficult because of the large volumes of water involved and the resulting significant dilution.

But what about the intentional introduction of a chemical, biological, or radiological (CBR) agent into an aquifer, so as to cause a large number of deaths?  At first, this appears so ridiculous as to promote immediate dismissal of the concept.  If the contamination of a reservoir or storage tank with a lethal dose of a CBR agent is difficult to accomplish, then what about aquifers, whose water volumes are often measured in cubic kilometers?  But it may be possible that a biotoxin might prove more appropriate to contaminate an aquifer than a chemical or radiological agent.

Here are some of the questions that I think are important:

• Which aquifer types would a terrorist seek to contaminate?
• Which aquifers in the USA (and the world) have recharge areas that are well-known and accessible?
• Which aquifers have short travel times from recharge areas to supply wells?
• Which aquifers provide little opportunity for a toxin to disperse, sorb, react, or degrade? 
• Which aquifers have relatively low storage volumes between recharge areas and supply wells?
• Which (bio)toxins might be suitable for terrorist acts directed at aquifers?

In terms of vulnerability, certain types of aquifers come to mind - karst, fractured rock, and volcanic rock aquifers.

I have attached a pdf [see above] of a brief article I wrote a few years ago that was published in Ground Water News and Views, a newsletter of the National Ground Water Association. At the time some criticized me for broaching this topic, lest I give some people ideas. If that's the case, we should probably not discuss anything unpleasant, since there may be some "copycats" out there. I like to think that if more people had thought about commercial airliners being used as weapons of mass destruction we might have avoided 9/11.

I recall talking to an NGWA colleague who attended a meeting held in Atlanta shortly after 9/11. The meeting revolved around the safety of water supplies in the age of terrorism. He heard not one word about groundwater - either as an agent of terrorism or as a supply in cases where surface water supplies were compromised.

Lest you think I am giving ideas to terrorists, keep in mind that this material has been around for 12 years.

Time to rethink things.

Enjoy. Or not.

"The only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing." - attributed to Edmund Burke

CRS Report: 'Management of the Colorado River: Water Allocations, Drought, and the Federal Role' (Updated 21 March 2019)

Another timely (21 March 2019) CRS report from Charles V. Stern and Pervaze A. Sheikh: Management of the Colorado River: Water Allocation, Drought, and the Federal Role. 

Download CRS_Mgmt_CR_Allocation_Drought_21March2019

The first few sections follow. Don't forget the last section 'Issues for Congress'.

Click on the graphics to enlarge them.

Introduction

The Colorado River Basin covers more than 246,000 square miles in seven U.S. states (Wyoming, Colorado, Utah, New Mexico, Arizona, Nevada, and California) and Mexico. Pursuant to federal law, the Bureau of Reclamation (part of the Department of the Interior) manages much of the basin’s water supplies. Colorado River water is used primarily for agricultural irrigation and municipal and industrial (M&I) uses, but it also is important for power production, fish and wildlife, and recreational uses. 

 

In recent years, consumptive uses of Colorado River water have exceeded natural flows. This causes an imbalance in the basin’s available supplies and competing demands. A drought in the basin dating to 2000 has raised the prospect of water delivery curtailments and decreased hydropower production, among other things. In the future, observers expect that increasing demand for supplies, coupled with the effects of climate change, will further increase the strain on the basin’s limited water supplies. 

River Management

The Law of the River is the commonly used shorthand for the multiple laws, court decisions, and other documents governing Colorado River operations. The foundational document of the Law of the River is the Colorado River Compact of 1922. Pursuant to the compact, the basin states established a framework to apportion the water supplies between the Upper and Lower Basins of the Colorado River, with the dividing line between the two basins at Lees Ferry, AZ (near the Utah border). The Upper and Lower Basins each were allocated 7.5 million acre-feet (maf) annually under the Colorado River Compact; an additional 1.5 maf in annual flows was made available to Mexico under a 1944 treaty. Future agreements and court decisions addressed numerous other issues (including intrastate allocations of flows), and subsequent federal legislation provided authority and funding for federal facilities that allowed users to develop their allocations. A Supreme Court ruling also confirmed that Congress designated the Secretary of the Interior as the water master for the Lower Basin, a role in which the federal government manages the delivery of all water below Hoover Dam.

Reclamation and basin stakeholders closely track the status of two large reservoirs—Lake Powell in the Upper Basin and Lake Mead in the Lower Basin—as an indicator of basin storage conditions. Under recent guidelines, dam releases from these facilities are tied to specific water storage levels. For Lake Mead, the first tier of “shortage,” under which Arizona’s and Nevada’s allocations would be decreased, would be triggered if Lake Mead’s January 1 elevation is expected to fall below 1,075 feet above mean sea level. As of early 2019, Reclamation projected that there is an almost 70% chance of a shortage condition at Lake Mead beginning in 2020; there is also a lesser chance of Lake Powell reaching critically low levels in the next five years.

 

Drought Contingency Plans

Despite previous efforts to alleviate shortages in the basin, the possibility of water delivery curtailments for basin users has increased. After several years of negotiations, Reclamation and the basin states in 2018 announced draft drought contingency plans (DCPs) for the Upper and Lower Basins. These plans would commit states to water supply cutbacks tied to reservoir storage levels (i.e., cutbacks in excess of previous cutback commitments), among other things. For the DCPs to be finalized, states and stakeholders must approve intrastate commitments (the agreements that make it possible for the states to realize their responsibilities in the DCPs). Federal implementation of the agreements also requires congressional authorization. DOI has stated that if the relevant entities do not approve the DCPs in a timely manner, then it may implement additional curtailments. 

Congressional Role

Congress plays a multifaceted role in federal management of the Colorado River basin. Congress funds and oversees management of basin facilities, including operations and programs to protect and restore endangered species. It also has enacted and continues to consider Indian water rights settlements involving Colorado River waters and development of new water storage facilities in the basin. In addition, Congress has authorized and approved funding to mitigate water shortages and conserve basin water supplies and has considered enacting new authorities to combat drought and its effects on basin water users.

Great material for my US Water Management class!

Enjoy!

“Water problems in the western United States, when viewed from afar, can seem tantalizingly easy to solve: all we need to do is turn off the fountains at the Bellagio, stop selling hay to China, ban golf, cut down the almond trees, and kill all the lawyers.” - David Owen, Where the Water Goes: Life and Death Along the Colorado River

Paper: 'The Implementation of the Western Climate Initiative - How North American States and Provinces Lead International Climate Negotiations'

Whatever happened to the Western Climate Initiative (WCI)? Initially, 25 jurisdictions expressed strong interest in the WCI. It was a pretty ambitious plan, what with 7 US states and 4 Canadian provinces ultimately pledging to do something about climate change. But in the end (?), just California and Québec remained. 

What happened? This paper by Annie Chaloux of the Université de Sherbrooke will help you understand: The Implementation of the Western Climate Initiative: How North American States and Provinces Lead International Climate Negotiations by Annie Chaloux, International Negotiation 22 (2): 239-258 (2017) doi 10.1163/15718069-22021113

I posted one her other papers a dew days ago: Green Paradiplomacy and Water Resource Management in North America: the Case of the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin. Another very good read.

Download The_Implementation_of_the_Western_Climate

Abstract
The Western Climate Initiative is internationally recognized as a success story in global climate negotiations. However, between the first expression of the idea of a cap-and-trade system in 2007 and the launch of carbon trading in 2013, the number of participating Canadian provinces and us states fell from 11 to 2, and important hurdles risked derailing the project completely. The trajectory of this innovative cross-boundary policy holds important lessons for the prospects and pitfalls of green paradiplomacy in North America. This paper examines the impetus for subnational efforts to combat climate change in the face of federal inaction, and, through detailed examination of the wci, looks at jurisdictional, administrative, legal, political, social and economic factors that complicate the implementation of these initiatives. The analysis enables a better understanding of prospects for the establishment of norms, rules and institutions among North American federated states that can provide durable environmental regimes.

Conclusion
The 2007 plan for a multisectoral cap-and-trade system at subnational level was an ambitious idea put forth by subnational actors to counter what they saw as federal inaction on an important issue. However, despite strong initial interest from 25 jurisdictions, and early adhesion by 11, most states and provinces then abandoned the WCI, leaving California and Québec alone in the elaboration of what would become the largest carbon market in North America. These actors might have followed the pack and abandoned the idea as less relevant or impactful without other members. They also might have succumbed to the political, administrative, legal, social and economic challenges to implementation of the WCI. In short, the initiative could well have resulted in failure. In fact, it has done the opposite, overcoming obstacles that produced delays and officially launching the cap-and-trade system in 2013. Most importantly, the achievement of early targets and buy-in by affected GHG emitters in these two jurisdictions has sent strong encouraging signals to other potential subnational partners.

While it remains impossible, for the moment, to thoroughly evaluate the robustness of this cap-and-trade system, this article has highlighted some key elements that further studies might pursue in analyzing the implementation of subnational initiatives to combat climate change. It is evident that states and provinces want to be at the forefront of climate action, and implementa- tion of the WCI demonstrates the potential of green paradiplomacy to durably reconfigure North American climate and environmental governance.

Close, but no cigar...yet. Still a good idea...

Enjoy!

"The climate system is an angry beast, and we are poking at it with sticks." - Wallace (Wally) Broecker of @Columbia at @UNM E&PS seminar, c. 1991

'CRS Report: 'Water Resource Issues in the 116th Congress (Updated 7 February 2019)

Updated on 7 February 2019: Water Resource Issues in the 116th Congress by an all-star CRS team: Nicole T. Carter, Charles V. Stern, Pervaze A. Sheikh, Peter Folger, Eva Lipiec and Anna E. Normand. 

Download CRS_WR_Issues_116Congress_7February2019

This short report deals with a plethora of water resource issues: USACE projects and activities; Western water and USBR; Indian water rights settlements; Canada and Mexico (Great Lakes; Columbia River Treaty; Coloriado River, Rio Grande); USGS water resource science; aging and new water infrastructure; partnerships; environmental protection and restoration; flood resilience and natural and nature-based approaches; and RECHARGING GROUBWATER (italics mine)! I did not see a specific 'Water Quality' heading but that all-important topic could be subsumed within a number of the above categories. 

Note: this graphic comes from another CRS report.

Summary
The 116th Congress may conduct oversight and deliberate on authorization and funding of water resource development, management, and protection. Congress engages in authorization and appropriations for water resource projects and activities of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) and the Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation). USACE constructs projects nationwide, primarily to improve navigation, reduce flood damage, and restore aquatic ecosystems. Reclamation constructs projects in the 17 arid states west of the Mississippi River; these projects primarily provide water supply benefits, often to agricultural irrigation users. The 116th Congress, like earlier Congresses, also may consider Indian water rights settlements and may evaluate the focus of and funding for the water resource science activities of the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS).

Development pressures, droughts and floods, and concerns about changing hydrology from land- use change and climate change have engendered nonfederal interest in federal financial and technical assistance for water resource science and projects. Stakeholders are interested in a range of water resource issues, including

•   new water resource infrastructure (e.g., storm surge gates, water storage) and new kinds of projects (e.g., groundwater recharge, nature-based flood risk reduction);

•   reinvestment in aging water resource infrastructure and use of water science and real- time monitoring and forecasting to improve infrastructure operations;

•   funding and financing of projects, and whether and how to shift from federally led projects to federal partnerships with state and/or local entities; and

•   activities to protect and restore aquatic ecosystems and enhance flood resilience (including the use of nature-based approaches).

  Some topics arise within the context of specific agencies. USACE-related topics for the 116th
  Congress may include funding and financing issues, such as use of the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund; the status of investments in projects to deepen coastal harbors; USACE budgeting priorities; and oversight of USACE efforts to implement public-private partnerships and develop alternative financing opportunities. Some Reclamation-related water project and management issues during the 116th Congress may include the status of proposed new and augmented water storage projects, as well as efforts to address the agency’s aging infrastructure and transition certain qualifying projects to nonfederal ownership. Congress also may address Reclamation drought mitigation activities in the Colorado River basin and other areas. In addition, Congress may exploreongoing issues associated with Reclamation’s project operations in California and other areas. It may address how these issues affect water deliveries to irrigation districts and municipalities and threatened and endangered species, among others.

  Some topics are international in character. Regarding freshwater bodies shared with Canada, potential topics for the 116th Congress include federal funding for activities supporting Great Lakes restoration and negotiations (and any resulting agreements) with Canada to modify the Columbia River Treaty. Potential topics related to Mexico include oversight of a binational agreement on water sharing during dry conditions in the Colorado River basin and Mexico’s deliveries to theUnited States in the Rio Grande basin.

  Crosscutting topics (i.e., topics relevant to multiple agencies and programs) also are part of congressional water resource deliberations. For example, the 116th Congress may consider the status and priority of new and ongoing federal efforts to restore large-scale aquatic ecosystems that have been altered or impaired by changes to their natural conditions (e.g., Florida Everglades, Chesapeake Bay). Congress may explore the funding and performance of existing restoration efforts, including what changes (if any) may be necessary to improve project delivery and evaluation. The 116th Congress may consider its guidance to multiple federal agencies on how to respond to flood hazards, including efforts related to enhancing the resilience of infrastructure and communities to flooding. There is interest in developing and evaluating approaches that protect natural elements that reduce flood risk (e.g., natural dunes) or are “nature-based” in comprehensive flood risk management (e.g., constructed dunes). Congress also may consider legislation and oversight on USACE supplemental appropriations for response to and recovery from floods.

Cutting to the chase...

Conclusion
Many factors shape the water resource issues before the 116th Congress. These factors include demand for reliable water supplies; hydrologic conditions, such as droughts, floods, and effects of climate change; issues regarding safety and performance of existing infrastructure, and interests and concerns about alternative financing and public-private partnerships.

The 116th Congress may consider some measures proposed but not enacted in the 115th Congress, as well as new legislative proposals. In the water resource area, legislative activity often is specific to the federal water resource management agencies or to water use by particular sectors, including energy, agriculture, navigation, recreation, and municipal and industrial use. Occasionally, Congress takes up broader water resource policy issues, such as coordination of federal water resource activities, programs, science, and research.

Congress and other decisionmakers often make water resource decisions within a complicated context. These decisions may involve existing federal infrastructure and their beneficiaries, multiple or conflicting objectives, various legal decisions, multiple environmental and natural resource statutes, and long-established institutional mechanisms (e.g., water rights and contractual obligations). These decisions also occur within a federalist framework in which water resource responsibilities are shared with state, local, and tribal governments and the private sector.

Broad water resource questions for the 116th Congress described herein include the following:

•   For existing water resource facilities, including aging dams, levees, and navigation channels, what will be the federal role and level of investment in maintaining performance and safety?

•   For planning and construction of new or expanded water resource projects, what will be the circumstances, conditions, and nature of federal involvement?

•   For water resource project design and operations, how may federal and nonfederal science, observation, and monitoring be used to improve performance?

Let's hope Congress gets some of these issues off its platter and into reality.

Enjoy!

"The American Republic will endure until the day Congress discovers that it can bribe the public with the public's money." - Alexis de Tocqueville

GAO Report: 'Climate Change - Activities of Selected Agencies to Address Potential Impact on Global Migration'

Timely or what? From the USGAO (17 January 2019): Climate Change: Activities of Selected Agencies to Address Potential Impact on Global Migration.

Download GAO_CC_Migration_Highlights (one-pager)

Download GAO_CC_Global_Migration_Accessible_Full_Report

Fast Facts

Climate change may increase the frequency and intensity of natural disasters, which could drive people around the world from their homes.

We found that, while the State Department, USAID, and DOD haven’t focused on the link between climate change and migration, State identified migration as a risk in one of its climate change risk assessments in early 2017.

However, State later changed its approach and no longer provides clear guidance to its staff on how to assess climate change risks. This may prevent it from identifying and addressing climate change as a factor in human migration.

We recommended State provide its staff with this guidance.

 

What GAO Found

From fiscal years 2014 through 2018, a variety of executive branch actions related to climate change—such as executive orders and strategies—affected the Department of State (State), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Department of Defense (DOD), including their activities that could potentially address the nexus of climate change and migration. For example, a fiscal year 2016 presidential memorandum—rescinded in 2017—required agencies to develop implementation plans to identify the potential impact of climate change on human mobility, among other things. In general, however, climate change as a driver of migration was not a focus of the executive branch actions. For example, a fiscal year 2014 executive order—also rescinded in 2017—requiring agencies to prepare for the impacts of climate change did not highlight migration as a particular concern.

State, USAID, and DOD have discussed the potential effects of climate change on migration in agency plans and risk assessments. For example, State and USAID required climate change risk assessments when developing country and regional strategies, and a few of the strategies reviewed by GAO identified the nexus of climate change and migration as a risk. However, State changed its approach in 2017, no longer providing missions with guidance on whether and how to include climate change risks in their integrated country strategies. In doing so, State did not include in its 2018 guidance to the missions any information on how to include climate change risks, should the missions choose to do so. Without clear guidance, State may miss opportunities to identify and address issues related to climate change as a potential driver of migration.

The three agencies have been involved in climate change related activities but none were specifically focused on the nexus with global migration. For example, USAID officials said that the agency's adaptation efforts, such as its Pastoralist Areas Resilience Improvement through Market Expansion project in Ethiopia, were the most likely to include activities, such as enhancing resilience, that can indirectly address the issue of climate change as a driver of migration.

A U.S. Agency for International Development Project in Ethiopia Includes Activities to Enhance Resilience That Can Indirectly Address Climate Change as a Driver of Migration

Why GAO Did This Study

The effects of climate change, combined with other factors, may alter human migration trends across the globe, according to the International Organization for Migration. For example, climate change can increase the frequency and intensity of natural disasters, causing populations to move from an area. Climate change can also intensify slow-onset disasters, such as drought, crop failure, or sea level rise, potentially altering longer-term migration trends.

GAO was asked to review how U.S. agencies address climate change as a potential driver of global migration. For State, USAID, and DOD, this report (1) describes executive branch actions related to climate change and migration from fiscal years 2014 through 2018; (2) examines the extent to which the agencies discussed the potential effects of climate change on migration in their plans and risk assessments; and (3) describes agency activities on the issue. GAO analyzed documents on administration priorities; reviewed agency plans, risk assessments, and documentation of agency activities; and interviewed agency officials.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that State provide missions with guidance that clearly documents its process for climate change risk assessments for country strategies. In commenting on a draft of this report, State indicated that it would update its integrated country strategy guidance and will specifically note that missions have the option to provide additional information on climate resilience and related topics.

For more information, contact David Gootnick at (202) 512-3149 or gootnickd@gao.gov or Brian J. Lepore at (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov.

Bangladesh is expected to experience migration due to climate change

State, DoD and USAID need to get their acts together.

Enjoy!

"Poor is the pupil that does not surpass his master." - Leonardo da Vinci (thanks to Jay Lund)