WaterWired

USGAO Report: 'Climate Change - Opportunities to Reduce Federal Fiscal Exposure'

Hot off the press (11 June 2019) from the USGAO:CLIMATE CHANGE: Opportunities to Reduce Federal Fiscal Exposure.

Download USGAO_CC_Full_Report

Download USGAO_CC_Full_Report_Accessible

Download USGAO_CC_Highlights

Fast Facts
There were 14 separate billion-dollar weather and climate disaster events in the U.S. in 2018—with a total cost of at least $91 billion. These costs will likely rise as the climate changes, researchers say. The federal government’s fiscal exposure from climate change is on our High Risk List.

We testified about potential budget impacts from climate change and how the government can reduce fiscal exposure, among other things. Climate change could damage federal property and increase the cost of disaster aid and some property and crop insurance. One way to reduce fiscal exposure is to establish federal strategic climate change priorities.

Examples of Potential Economic Effects from Climate Change by 2100

What GAO Found
The estimated economic effects of climate change, while imprecise, can convey useful insight about potential damages in the United States. In September 2017, GAO reported that the potential economic effects of climate change could be significant and unevenly distributed across sectors and regions (see figure). This is consistent with the recent findings of the U.S. Global Change Research Program's Fourth National Climate Assessment, which concluded, among other things, that the continued increase in the frequency and extent of high-tide flooding due to sea level rise threatens America's trillion-dollar coastal infrastructure.

Information about the potential economic effects of climate change could inform decision makers about significant potential damages in different U.S. sectors or regions. According to prior GAO work, this information could help decision makers identify significant climate risks as an initial step toward managing them.

The federal government faces fiscal exposure from climate change risks in several areas, including:

• Disaster aid: due to the rising number of natural disasters and increasing reliance on federal assistance. GAO has previously reported that the federal government does not adequately plan for disaster resilience. GAO has also reported that, due to an artifically low indicator for determining a jursidiction's ability to respond to disasters that was set in 1986, the Federal Emergency Management Agency risks recommending federal assistance for juridisctions that could recover on their own.
• Federal insurance for property and crops: due, in part, to the vulnerability of insured property and crops to climate change impacts. Federal flood and crop insurance programs were not designed to generate sufficient funds to fully cover all losses and expenses. The flood insurance program, for example, was about $21 billion in debt to the Treasury as of April 2019. Further, the Congressional Budget Office estimated in May 2019 that federal crop insurance would cost the federal government an average of about $8 billion annually from 2019 through 2029.
• Operation and management of federal property and lands: due to the hundreds of thousands of federal facilities and millions of acres of land that could be affected by a changing climate and more frequent extreme events. For example, in 2018, Hurricane Michael devastated Tyndall Air Force Base in Florida, with a preliminary repair estimate of $3 billion.

The federal budget, however, does not generally account for disaster assistance provided by Congress or the long-term impacts of climate change on existing federal infrastructure and programs. GAO has reported that more complete information about fiscal exposure could help policymakers better understand the trade-offs when making spending decisions.

Further, federal investments in resilience to reduce fiscal exposures have been limited. As GAO has reported, enhancing resilience can reduce fiscal exposure by reducing or eliminating long-term risk to people and property from natural hazards. For example, a 2018 interim report by the National Institute of Building Sciences estimated approximate benefits to society in excess of costs for several types of resilience projects. While precise benefits are uncertain, the report estimated that for every dollar invested in designing new buildings to particular design standards, society could accrue benefits amounting to about $11 on average.

The federal government has invested in individual agency efforts that could help build resilience within existing programs or projects. For example, the National Climate Assessment reported that the U.S. military integrates climate risks into its analysis, plans, and programs. In additon, as GAO reported in March 2019, the Disaster Recovery Reform Act of 2018 could improve resilience by allowing the President to set aside a portion of certain grants for pre-disaster mitigation. However, the federal government has not undertaken strategic government-wide planning to manage climate risks.

GAO's March 2019 High-Risk report identified a number of recommendations GAO has made related to fiscal exposure to climate change. The federal government could reduce its fiscal exposure by implementing these recommendations. Among GAO's key government-wide recommendations are:

• Entities within the Executive Office of the President (EOP) should work with partners to establish federal strategic climate change priorities that reflect the full range of climate-related federal activities;
• Entities within EOP should use information on potential economic effects from climate change to help identify significant climate risks and craft appropriate federal responses;
• Entities within EOP should designate a federal entity to develop and update a set of authoritative climate observations and projections for use in federal decision making, and create a national climate information system with defined roles for federal agencies and certain nonfederal entities; and
• The Department of Commerce should convene federal agencies to provide the best-available forward-looking climate information to organizations that develop design standards and building codes to enhance infrastructure resilience.

Why GAO Did This Study
Since 2005, federal funding for disaster assistance is at least $450 billion, including approximately $19.1 billion in supplemental appropriations signed into law on June 6, 2019. In 2018 alone, there were 14 separate billion-dollar weather and climate disaster events across the United States, with a total cost of at least $91 billion, according to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. The U.S. Global Change Research Program projects that disaster costs will likely increase as certain extreme weather events become more frequent and intense due to climate change.

The costs of recent weather disasters have illustrated the need for planning for climate change risks and investing in resilience. Resilience is the ability to prepare and plan for, absorb, recover from, and more successfully adapt to adverse events, according to the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine. Investing in resilience can reduce the need for far more costly steps in the decades to come.

Since February 2013, GAO has included Limiting the Federal Government's Fiscal Exposure by Better Managing Climate Change Risks on its list of federal program areas at high risk of vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement or most in need of transformation. GAO updates this list every 2 years. In March 2019, GAO reported that the federal government had not made measurable progress since 2017 to reduce fiscal exposure to climate change.

This testimony—based on reports GAO issued from October 2009 to March 2019—discusses (1) what is known about the potential economic effects of climate change in the United States and the extent to which this information could help federal decision makers manage climate risks across the federal government, (2) the potential impacts of climate change on the federal budget, (3) the extent to which the federal government has invested in resilience, and (4) how the federal government could reduce fiscal exposure to the effects of climate change.

GAO has made 62 recommendations related to the Limiting the Federal Government’s Fiscal Exposure by Better Managing Climate Change Risks high-risk area. As of December 2018, 25 of those recommendations remained open.

For more information, contact J. Alfredo Gómez at (202) 512-3841 or gomezj@gao.gov.

Enjoy!

"Why is that none of our “professional” track journalism faculty can ever report on a deadline?" - @ass_deans

CRS Report: 'Columbia River Treaty Review' (Updated 21 May 2019) Do We Need a Compact Too?

This CRS report was updated by Charles V. Stern on 21 May 2019: Columbia River Treaty Review. 

Download CRS_Columbia_River_Treaty_Rev_21May2019

Summary
The Columbia River Treaty (CRT, or Treaty) is an international agreement between the United States and Canada for the cooperative development and operation of the water resources of the Columbia River Basin to provide for flood control and power. The Treaty was the result of more than 20 years of negotiations between the two countries and was ratified in 1961. Implementation began in 1964.

The Treaty provided for the construction and operation of three dams in Canada and one dam in the United States whose reservoir extends into Canada. Together, these dams more than doubled the amount of reservoir storage available in the basin and provided significant flood protection benefits. In exchange for these benefits, the United States agreed to provide Canada with lump- sum cash payments and a portion of downstream hydropower benefits that are attributable to Canadian operations under the CRT, known as the “Canadian Entitlement.” Some have estimated the Canadian Entitlement to be worth as much as $335 million annually.

The CRT has no specific end date, and most of its provisions would continue indefinitely without action by the United States or Canada. Beginning in September 2024, either nation can terminate most provisions of the Treaty with at least 10 years’ written notice (i.e., starting as early as 2014). To date, neither country has given notice of termination, but both countries have indicated a preliminary interest in modification of the treaty. If the CRT is not terminated or modified, most of its provisions would continue, with the exception of its flood control provisions (which are scheduled to transition automatically to “called-upon” operations at that time, meaning the United States would request and compensate Canada for flood control operations as necessary).

Perspectives on the CRT and its review vary. Some believe the Treaty should include stronger provisions related to tribal resources and flows for fisheries that are not in the Treaty; others disagree and focus on the perceived need to adjust the Canadian Entitlement to reflect actual hydropower benefits. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Bonneville Power Administration, in their joint role as the U.S. Entity overseeing the Treaty, undertook a review of the CRT from 2009 to 2013. Based on studies and stakeholder input, they provided a Regional Recommendation to the State Department in December 2013. They recommended continuing the Treaty with certain modifications, including rebalancing the CRT’s hydropower provisions, further delineating called-upon flood control operations after 2024, and incorporating into the Treaty flows to benefit Columbia River fisheries. For its part, the Canadian Entity (the Province of British Columbia) released in March 2013 a recommendation to continue the CRT with modifications “within the Treaty framework.” It disputed several assumptions in the U.S. Entity’s review process.

Following a two-year federal interagency review of the U.S. Regional Recommendation, the U.S. State Department finalized its negotiating parameters and authorized talks with Canada in October 2016. Between May 2018 and May 2019, U.S. and Canadian negotiating teams held six rounds of negotiations. Additional negotiations are expected in 2019.

If the executive branch comes to an agreement regarding modification of the CRT, the Senate may be asked to weigh in on future versions of the Treaty pursuant to its constitutional role to provide advice and consent. Both houses have also weighed in on CRT-related activities through their oversight roles.

Cutting to the chase...

The Role of Congress in Treaty Review
The President, through the National Security Council, determines the negotiating position on the CRT, and the State Department is responsible for conducting negotiations related to the Treaty. However, Congress is also involved in this process. The Constitution gives the Senate the power to approve, by a two-thirds vote, treaties negotiated by the executive branch.53 The Senate does

not ratify treaties; instead it takes up a resolution of ratification, by which the Senate may formally provide its advice and consent on the ratification process. The Senate is not required to provide an up or down vote on a resolution of ratification, nor are treaties required to be resubmitted after each Congress.

In the case of the CRT, as the Treaty has been previously negotiated and ratified, the Senate would take up a resolution of ratification if the United States and Canada agree to Treaty modifications and the executive branch submits the modification to the Senate for review (if the Treaty is continued without modification or terminated, there would be no advice and consent role unless there was a new Treaty that needs to be ratified).

Both the House and the Senate have also weighed in on Treaty review in their oversight capacities. Additionally, the Northwest delegation (including all 26 lawmakers representing Idaho, Montana, Oregon, and Washington) sent letters to President Obama in 2014 and 2015 expressing concerns with the perceived slow pace of the Interagency Policy Committee review process. In April 2015, lawmakers expressed a collective desire to finalize an Administration position and begin negotiations with Canada in 2015. On June 21, 2017, a bipartisan group of seven House Members from Washington and Oregon wrote to President Trump requesting prompt commencement of CRT negotiations.

My sense, and this is mainly just a gut feeling, is that Canadian stakeholders have had more input than US ones. I have friends on both sides of the border.

Do We Need a Compact for the Snake-Columbia Basin?
Okay - this is a separate issue from the CRT.

It's surprising to me that the there is no compact among the US Columbia River basin states. As someone who cut his teeth on water issues in Arizona, Nevada, and New Mexico (all Colorado River Compact states) and seeing Colorado, New Mexico and Texas battle over the Rio Grande,. I have seen the utiiity of compacts. When I arrived in Oregon in 2006 I was surprised to find that there was no compact among the Columbia River (or Columbia-Snake Basin - CSB) states of Oregon, Washington, Idaho (the big three), Montana, Wyoming, Utah and Nevada. Furthermore, the seemed to be little concern over this. Read on...

I wrote a bunch on this topic in 2013. I will repost it here.

In 2006, when I arrived in Oregon from New Mexico, I was quite surprsied to learn that the Columbia-Snake Basin (CSB) did not have a compact. Keep in mind that I learned my water in the arid Southwest: AZ, NM, and NV. Hard to imagine places much drier than those three states, where I would joke that any interstate perennial waterway that can allow two minnows to swim side-by-side probably has a compact governing water allocation. Well, maybe not, but rivers like the Colorado, Rio Grande, Pecos, Truckee, et al., none of which comes close to matching the flow of the CSB, all have compacts.

Therein lies the issue: the CSB produces so much water - the mean annual flow of the Columbia at its mouth is about 200 MAF (about 7800 cms) - that people don't seem to worry about allocation among the states. When talking to PNW WaterWonks (or Water Buffaloes) I get four reasons why a CSB compact is unnecessary:

1) there's plenty of water for all;
2) all the states pretty much get along when it comes to water;
3) a compact might sour relations among the seven states; and
4) too many stakeholders would have to be involved.  

The last reason reminds me of the 'old days' when you had irrigators, hydropower/flood control people and water supply-types calling the shots. Today, you'd need those pesky enviros, tribes, watershed council types, tribes - all those folks. Gees, what mess - you'd have to rent the Rose Garden to have a stakeholders' meeting!

The first two reasons are interesting. Sure, we generally have enough water and the states do seem to get along when it comes to water. Try Texas and New Mexico!

The third reason might be valid. whenever you have a formal agreement, you have lawyers. No more settling disputes over lunch or breakfast. Litigation, anyone?  

But the reason I think we need a compact is the future. Things might be fine now, water-wise, but what about the effects of climate change on water supply? We are already seeing those effects. Without an agreement now, when things are relatively tranquil, what would it be like to have to devise a compact when times are tough, water is short and more people are present? And forget about fighting amongst yourselves; you might want some protection from outsiders' depredations (think Great Lakes Compact). You want ugly?

And imagine a compact with Nevada - yes, it is in the CSB - with water-hungry Las Vegas. Interesting... 

I have heard that in the last 20-30 years an attempt was made to craft a compact; it obviously failed.

Believe me, I am not underestimating how difficult it would be to develop a compact. A daunting task - getting seven states to agree on water allocation, environmental flows, etc. - say what? But creating a flexible, adaptive, binding document to ensure a relatvely peaceful, secure water future for the states of the Columbia-Snake basin is well worth it.

Handshake agreements may be nice, but when the 'old hands' are gone, nothing beats a legally binding document.

Not much has happened since then to change my thinking. If anything, I am more convinced now than then. I suspect agreeing on a CSB compact would be much harder that negotiating the CRT. It will get harder as time goes by.

Enjoy! 

"Life is like a sewer. What you get out of it depends upon what you put into it." - Tom Lehrer (quoted in @Forbesvia@TheWeek)

CRS Report: 'Indian Water Rights Settlements' (16 April 2019)

Here is an updated (16 April 2019) CRS report by Charles V. Stern, Indian Water Rights Settlements.

Download CRS_Indian_Water_Rights_16April2019

Summary

In the second half of the 19th century, the federal government pursued a policy of confining Indian tribes to reservations. These reservations were either a portion of a tribe’s aboriginal land or an area of land taken out of the public domain and set aside for a tribe. The federal statutes and treaties reserving such land for Indian reservations typically did not address the water needs of these reservations, a fact that has given rise to questions and disputes regarding Indian reserved water rights. Dating to a 1908 Supreme Court ruling, courts generally have held that many tribes have a reserved right to water sufficient to fulfill the purpose of their reservations and that this right took effect on the date the reservations were established. This means that, in the context of a state water law system of prior appropriations, which is common in many U.S. western states, many tribes have water rights senior to those of non-Indian users with water rights and access established subsequent to the Indian reservations’ creation. Although many Indian tribes hold senior water rights through their reservations, the quantification of these rights is undetermined in many cases.

Tribes have pursued quantification of their water rights through both litigation and negotiated settlements. The settlements involve negotiation between tribes, the federal government, states, water districts, and private water users, among others. They aim to resolve conflict between rights holders and allow the parties to determine specific terms of water allocation and use with certainty. Over the last 50 years, negotiated settlements have been the preferred course for most tribes because they are often less lengthy and costly than litigation. Additionally, many stakeholders have noted that these negotiated agreements are more likely to allow tribes not only to quantify their water rights on paper but also to procure access to these resources in the form of infrastructure and other related expenses, at least in some cases.

After being negotiated, approval and implementation of Indian water rights settlements require federal action. As of 2019, 36 Indian water rights settlements had been federally approved, with total costs in excess of $5.8 billion. Of these, 32 settlements were approved and enacted by Congress and 4 were administratively approved by the U.S. Departments of Justice and the Interior. After being congressionally authorized, federal projects associated with approved Indian water rights settlements generally have been implemented by the Bureau of Reclamation or the Bureau of Indian Affairs (both within the Department of the Interior), pursuant to congressional directions. Congress has appropriated discretionary and mandatory funding (and, in some cases, both) for these activities, including in recent appropriations bills. In the 116th Congress, H.R. 1904 proposes to extend certain mandatory funds for these settlements in perpetuity (the funding currently expires in FY2029).

Several individual Indian water rights settlements recently have been considered and enacted, including three that were enacted during the 114th Congress. A primary challenge facing new settlements is the availability of federal funds to implement ongoing and future agreements. Indian water rights settlements often involve the construction of major new water infrastructure to allow tribal communities to access water they hold rights to, and obtaining federal funding for these projects can be difficult. As a result, some settlements have been renegotiated to reduce their federal costs.

At issue is under what circumstances (if any) Congress should approve new Indian water rights settlements and whether Congress should fund (and in some cases amend) existing settlements. Some argue that resolution of Indian water rights settlements is a mutually beneficial means to resolve long-standing legal issues, provide certainty of water deliveries, and reduce the federal government’s liability. Others argue against authorization and funding of new settlements, either on general principle or with regard to specific individual settlements and activities.

Here is the map from the 17 July 2018 report (R44148):

Figure 1. Indian Reservations with Water Rights Settlements or Negotiations

Cutting to the chase...

Conclusion

Long-standing disputes over water rights and use involving Indian tribes continue to be negotiated and settled by the executive branch and are thus likely to be an ongoing issue for Congress. This matter includes implementation of ongoing Indian water rights settlements, negotiation of new settlements, and consideration of these settlements for potential enactment and subsequent funding. As of the end of the 115th Congress, 32 settlements had been enacted since 1978, and 4 settlements had been approved administratively. Additional funding for ongoing settlements and authorization of and appropriations for new settlements are likely to be requested in the future. In considering Indian water rights settlements, primary issues for Congress may include the cost, contents, and sufficiency of federally authorized efforts to settle tribal water rights claims, as well as the circumstances under which these settlements are considered and approved by authorizing committees and others (i.e., whether the settlements are accompanied by formal statements of Administration support, cost estimates, etc.). In addition, the preferred extent of federal involvement in implementing settlements, including the question of whether the federal government or tribes should take the lead in developing and constructing projects, may be of interest to Congress.

Enjoy!

"I like being over the hill. I've discovered there's a whole new landscape." - @Janefonda (quoted in @thesundaytimes via @TheWeek)

CRS Report: 'Terrorism and Security Issues Facing the Water Infrastructure Sector'; Weaponizing Groundwater Redux, More!

Claudia Copeland wrote this CRS report almost nine years ago (15 December 2010): Terrorism and Security Issues Facing the Water Infrastructure Sector.

I am surprised that this report has (apparently) not been updated; a search did not produce anything with a title similar to this one.  

Download CRS_Terrorism_Water_Infrastructure_15Dec2010

Summary
Damage to or destruction of the nation’s water supply and water quality infrastructure by terrorist attack or natural disaster could disrupt the delivery of vital human services in this country, threatening public health and the environment, or possibly causing loss of life. Interest in such problems has increased greatly since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States.

Across the country, water infrastructure systems extend over vast areas, and ownership and
operation responsibility are both public and private, but are overwhelmingly non-federal. Since 
the attacks, federal dam operators and local water and wastewater utilities have been under
heightened security conditions and are evaluating security plans and measures. There are no
federal standards or agreed-upon industry practices within the water infrastructure sector to
govern readiness, response to security incidents, and recovery. Efforts to develop protocols and
tools are ongoing since the 9/11 terrorist attacks. This report presents an overview of this large
and diverse sector, describes security-related actions by the government and private sector since
9/11, and discusses additional policy issues and responses, including congressional interest.

Policymakers have been considering a number of initiatives, including enhanced physical
security, better communication and coordination, and research. A key issue is how additional
protections and resources directed at public and private sector priorities will be funded. In
response, Congress has provided $923 million in appropriations for security at water
infrastructure facilities (to assess and protect federal facilities and support security assessment
and risk reduction activities by non-federal facilities) and passed a bill requiring drinking water
utilities to conduct security vulnerability assessments (P.L. 107-188). When Congress created the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2002 (P.L. 107-297), it gave DHS responsibilities to
coordinate information to secure the nation’s critical infrastructure, including the water sector.
Under Homeland Security Presidential Directive-7, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
is the lead federal agency for protecting drinking water and wastewater utility systems.

 

Recent congressional interest has focused on two legislative issues: (1) security of wastewater
utilities, and (2) whether to include water utilities in chemical plant security regulations
implemented by DHS. In the 109th Congress, a Senate committee approved legislation to
encourage wastewater treatment works to conduct vulnerability assessments and develop site
security plans. Similar legislation was introduced in the 111th Congress (H.R. 2883). Congress
also turned attention to legislation to extend DHS’s Chemical Facilities Anti-Terrorism Standards
and, as part of that debate, whether to preserve an existing exemption for water utilities from
chemical facility standards or to include them in the scope of DHS security rules. The House
passed H.R. 2868 in November 2009, with a provision to require water utilities to use safer
chemicals and technology, but the Senate did not act on that bill or a companion Senate measure,
S. 3598.

Here is an excellent 2006 article by Peter Gleick on Water and Terrorism:

Download GleickWaterTerrorism06

Not sure what prompted me to ferret out this CRS report but I do harbor an interest in terrorist attacks on water infrastructure or the use of water as an agent of terrorism (see this post from 7 January 2007, my second WaterWired post. There does not seem to be much written on the weaponization of groundwater. Here is something I wrote in 2005 that can be found in the aforementioned post:

  Download Weaponization_and_Groundwater_4282005

Here is what I wrote 12 years ago:

Most of the concern for water terrorism has rightly emphasized the protection of water intakes and other entry points into water distribution systems and the development of emergency supplies and response procedures.  The contamination of reservoirs is generally considered difficult because of the large volumes of water involved and the resulting significant dilution.

But what about the intentional introduction of a chemical, biological, or radiological (CBR) agent into an aquifer, so as to cause a large number of deaths?  At first, this appears so ridiculous as to promote immediate dismissal of the concept.  If the contamination of a reservoir or storage tank with a lethal dose of a CBR agent is difficult to accomplish, then what about aquifers, whose water volumes are often measured in cubic kilometers?  But it may be possible that a biotoxin might prove more appropriate to contaminate an aquifer than a chemical or radiological agent.

Here are some of the questions that I think are important:

• Which aquifer types would a terrorist seek to contaminate?
• Which aquifers in the USA (and the world) have recharge areas that are well-known and accessible?
• Which aquifers have short travel times from recharge areas to supply wells?
• Which aquifers provide little opportunity for a toxin to disperse, sorb, react, or degrade? 
• Which aquifers have relatively low storage volumes between recharge areas and supply wells?
• Which (bio)toxins might be suitable for terrorist acts directed at aquifers?

In terms of vulnerability, certain types of aquifers come to mind - karst, fractured rock, and volcanic rock aquifers.

I have attached a pdf [see above] of a brief article I wrote a few years ago that was published in Ground Water News and Views, a newsletter of the National Ground Water Association. At the time some criticized me for broaching this topic, lest I give some people ideas. If that's the case, we should probably not discuss anything unpleasant, since there may be some "copycats" out there. I like to think that if more people had thought about commercial airliners being used as weapons of mass destruction we might have avoided 9/11.

I recall talking to an NGWA colleague who attended a meeting held in Atlanta shortly after 9/11. The meeting revolved around the safety of water supplies in the age of terrorism. He heard not one word about groundwater - either as an agent of terrorism or as a supply in cases where surface water supplies were compromised.

Lest you think I am giving ideas to terrorists, keep in mind that this material has been around for 12 years.

Time to rethink things.

Enjoy. Or not.

"The only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing." - attributed to Edmund Burke

CRS Report: 'Management of the Colorado River: Water Allocations, Drought, and the Federal Role' (Updated 21 March 2019)

Another timely (21 March 2019) CRS report from Charles V. Stern and Pervaze A. Sheikh: Management of the Colorado River: Water Allocation, Drought, and the Federal Role. 

Download CRS_Mgmt_CR_Allocation_Drought_21March2019

The first few sections follow. Don't forget the last section 'Issues for Congress'.

Click on the graphics to enlarge them.

Introduction

The Colorado River Basin covers more than 246,000 square miles in seven U.S. states (Wyoming, Colorado, Utah, New Mexico, Arizona, Nevada, and California) and Mexico. Pursuant to federal law, the Bureau of Reclamation (part of the Department of the Interior) manages much of the basin’s water supplies. Colorado River water is used primarily for agricultural irrigation and municipal and industrial (M&I) uses, but it also is important for power production, fish and wildlife, and recreational uses. 

 

In recent years, consumptive uses of Colorado River water have exceeded natural flows. This causes an imbalance in the basin’s available supplies and competing demands. A drought in the basin dating to 2000 has raised the prospect of water delivery curtailments and decreased hydropower production, among other things. In the future, observers expect that increasing demand for supplies, coupled with the effects of climate change, will further increase the strain on the basin’s limited water supplies. 

River Management

The Law of the River is the commonly used shorthand for the multiple laws, court decisions, and other documents governing Colorado River operations. The foundational document of the Law of the River is the Colorado River Compact of 1922. Pursuant to the compact, the basin states established a framework to apportion the water supplies between the Upper and Lower Basins of the Colorado River, with the dividing line between the two basins at Lees Ferry, AZ (near the Utah border). The Upper and Lower Basins each were allocated 7.5 million acre-feet (maf) annually under the Colorado River Compact; an additional 1.5 maf in annual flows was made available to Mexico under a 1944 treaty. Future agreements and court decisions addressed numerous other issues (including intrastate allocations of flows), and subsequent federal legislation provided authority and funding for federal facilities that allowed users to develop their allocations. A Supreme Court ruling also confirmed that Congress designated the Secretary of the Interior as the water master for the Lower Basin, a role in which the federal government manages the delivery of all water below Hoover Dam.

Reclamation and basin stakeholders closely track the status of two large reservoirs—Lake Powell in the Upper Basin and Lake Mead in the Lower Basin—as an indicator of basin storage conditions. Under recent guidelines, dam releases from these facilities are tied to specific water storage levels. For Lake Mead, the first tier of “shortage,” under which Arizona’s and Nevada’s allocations would be decreased, would be triggered if Lake Mead’s January 1 elevation is expected to fall below 1,075 feet above mean sea level. As of early 2019, Reclamation projected that there is an almost 70% chance of a shortage condition at Lake Mead beginning in 2020; there is also a lesser chance of Lake Powell reaching critically low levels in the next five years.

 

Drought Contingency Plans

Despite previous efforts to alleviate shortages in the basin, the possibility of water delivery curtailments for basin users has increased. After several years of negotiations, Reclamation and the basin states in 2018 announced draft drought contingency plans (DCPs) for the Upper and Lower Basins. These plans would commit states to water supply cutbacks tied to reservoir storage levels (i.e., cutbacks in excess of previous cutback commitments), among other things. For the DCPs to be finalized, states and stakeholders must approve intrastate commitments (the agreements that make it possible for the states to realize their responsibilities in the DCPs). Federal implementation of the agreements also requires congressional authorization. DOI has stated that if the relevant entities do not approve the DCPs in a timely manner, then it may implement additional curtailments. 

Congressional Role

Congress plays a multifaceted role in federal management of the Colorado River basin. Congress funds and oversees management of basin facilities, including operations and programs to protect and restore endangered species. It also has enacted and continues to consider Indian water rights settlements involving Colorado River waters and development of new water storage facilities in the basin. In addition, Congress has authorized and approved funding to mitigate water shortages and conserve basin water supplies and has considered enacting new authorities to combat drought and its effects on basin water users.

Great material for my US Water Management class!

Enjoy!

“Water problems in the western United States, when viewed from afar, can seem tantalizingly easy to solve: all we need to do is turn off the fountains at the Bellagio, stop selling hay to China, ban golf, cut down the almond trees, and kill all the lawyers.” - David Owen, Where the Water Goes: Life and Death Along the Colorado River