WaterWired

RNRF Report: Paris Agreement Updates and the Ukraine Crisis’s Impact on Climate Action

The Renewable Natural Resources Foundation just published this brief report: Paris Agreement Updates and the Ukraine Crisis’s Impact on Climate Action.

Here we go:

On May 12^th and 13^th, 2022, representatives from nearly 50 countries met in Copenhagen to revisit 2022 climate targets and promote compliance with the Paris Agreement. This interim meeting was jointly hosted by Denmark, the United Kingdom (host of COP26 in 2021), and Egypt (host of COP27 in 2022). The meeting’s goal was to refocus global leaders on fulfilling and strengthening their climate pledges this year.

COP26 in Glasgow, held in late 2021, established a consensus that countries must do much more to address the climate crisis. However, nations stopped short of adopting commitments sufficiently ambitious to avert catastrophe. The meeting ended with an acknowledgement that, in 2022, countries must increase the ambition of their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), make progress on implementing existing NDCs, and greatly increase the amount of climate finance sent from developed countries to developing countries. Since that meeting, no countries have officially submitted updated commitments.

At the Copenhagen meeting, Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry announced that Egypt would be the first country to strengthen its NDC in 2022. He said that the new commitment would be officially announced “within a matter of weeks.” In recent years, Egypt has lagged behind other countries in updating its NDCs; its most recent update was in 2017.

The meeting in Copenhagen was largely focused on holding countries accountable for putting their existing NDCs into action. This has become a matter of heightened concern in 2022 in the context of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and subsequent shifts in the dynamics of energy geopolitics.

Russia is the largest supplier of oil and gas to the EU, and the EU has historically relied heavily on Russian imports to meet it energy needs. Since the invasion, sanctions have caused imports to be reduced, but drastic price increases have allowed Russia’s fossil fuel revenues from the EU to double. This revenue is helping aid the Russian war effort; continued fossil fuel imports are a significant gap in the efficacy of sanctions.

In response to this situation, European countries have sought to augment their energy supply from non-Russian sources. Despite climate pledges, this has included significant investment in new fossil fuel infrastructure. Germany, Italy, and France have begun investing in new liquified natural gas (LNG) terminals to import gas from countries like Canada, the U.S., Norway, and Qatar. Use of coal is also increasing. Across Europe, planned shutdowns of coal plants have been delayed, and some retired coal plants are now set to reopen. 

The European effort to reduce dependence on Russian fossil fuels has also included an initiative to scale up deployment of renewable energy. A new proposal from the European Commission, titled REPowerEU, would double solar photovoltaic capacity by 2025 and install 600GW by 2030. It would include a legal obligation for newly-constructed public, commercial, and residential buildings to include rooftop solar. It also aims to double the rate of deployment of heat pumps, promote the deployment of renewable hydrogen, and improve energy efficiency.

The war has diminished climate ambition in the U.S. as well. High gas prices have created political pressure for the Biden administration to augment energy supplies. In response, the administration has increased leasing for the extraction of oil and gas on public lands, despite a campaign promise to place a moratorium on such leases. This will hinder the U.S.’s ability to accomplish its commitment to reduce carbon emissions to half of 2005 levels by 2030. Critics have noted that these new leases will take years to actually produce energy and will not reduce gas prices in the short term.

Enjoy!

"Remember to look up at the stars and now down at your feet." - Stephen Hawking

Kira Jacobs of EPA: 'How to Develop Innovative Partnerships and Find Funding: 3 Projects to Inspire You!

G. Tracy Mehan III, Executive Director for Government Affairs at the American Water Works Association just sent me this presentation by Kira Jacobs of EPA Region 1 (Boston). Here is what he said in his email:

Kira Jacobs leads source water protection efforts for EPA Region 1.  Attached is a presentation she made on various Partnerships to address nonpoint source pollution including some USDA programs that we have discussed in the past. I recommend it to you. Kira is a great resource for all of us.

I am trying to get her for an AWRA Webinar!

Download Jacobs NEIWPCC NPS Conference Presentation April 28 2022

Enjoy!

CRS Report: 'Management of the Colorado River - Water Allocations, Drought, and the Federal Role' Updated: 6 April 2022

Charles V. Stern and Pervaze A. Sheikh have updated (6 April 2022) this important CRS report on my favorite river: Management of the Colorado River - Water Allocations, Drought, and the Federal Role'.

Download CRS_Report_Mgmt_CO_River_Fed_Role_6April2022  

Here is an updated map of the Colorado River Basin from the Lincoln Institute:

Download Crb_map_web

Summary
The Colorado River Basin covers more than 246,000 square miles in seven U.S. states (Wyoming, Colorado, Utah, New Mexico, Arizona, Nevada, and California) and Mexico. Pursuant to federal law, the Bureau of Reclamation (part of the Department of the Interior) manages much of the basin’s water supplies. Colorado River water is used primarily for agricultural irrigation and municipal and industrial (M&I) uses; it is also important for hydropower production, fish and wildlife, and recreational uses.

Apportioned Colorado River water is widely acknowledged to be in excess of the river’s natural flows, and consumptive use of these waters typically exceeds natural flows. This causes an imbalance in the basin’s available water supply and demand. Stress on basin water supplies is exacerbated by a long-term drought dating to 2000.

River Management
Multiple laws, court decisions, and other documents govern Colorado River operations; its foundational document is the Colorado River Compact of 1922. Pursuant to the compact, the basin states established a framework to apportion water supplies between the river’s Upper and Lower Basins, with the dividing line between the two basins at Lee Ferry, AZ. Each basin was allocated 7.5 million acre-feet (MAF) annually under the compact, and an additional 1.5 MAF in annual flows was made available to Mexico under a 1944 treaty. Further agreements and court decisions addressed other issues, and subsequent federal legislation provided authority and funding for federal facilities that allowed users to develop their allocations. A 1963 Supreme Court ruling confirmed that Congress designated the Secretary of the Interior as the water master for the Lower Basin, a role in which the federal government manages the delivery of all water below Hoover Dam.

Reclamation and basin stakeholders closely track the status of two large reservoirs—Lake Powell in the Upper Basin and Lake Mead in the Lower Basin—as an indicator of basin storage conditions. Under criteria agreed upon by basin states, water releases from both lakes are tied to specific water storage levels. In recent years, storage levels have been falling. On August 16, 2021, Reclamation declared the first-ever Level One Shortage Condition in the Lower Basin, which reduced water deliveries to contractors in Arizona and Nevada, as well as to Mexico. For its part, in 2022, Lake Powell’s surface water elevation fell below a key target (3,525 feet) established to protect hydropower infrastructure at Glen Canyon Dam. In response, Reclamation has implemented drought response operations intended to protect Lake Powell elevations.

Efforts to Address Drought
The federal government has led multiple efforts attempting to improve the basin’s water supply outlook, resulting in collaborative agreements in 2003 and 2007, and most recently in the 2019 drought contingency plans (DCPs) for the Upper and Lower Colorado River Basins. The latter agreements were authorized by Congress in the Colorado River Drought Contingency Plan Authorization Act (P.L. 116-14). The DCPs required reductions beyond previous curtailment plans based on Lake Mead storage levels, committed Reclamation to additional water conservation efforts, and put in place plans to coordinate Upper Basin operations to enhance Lake Powell storage levels and prevent the loss of hydropower generation.

The basin’s hydrologic outlook has further deteriorated since passage of the DCPs, and there remains widespread concern about the basin’s long-term water supply. Should the current drought continue, some see the potential for drastically reduced deliveries to some contractors, and/or a compact call (i.e., a call on water rights between the Lower and Upper Basins). A central question facing decisionmakers is whether to renew interim agreements (including the DCPs) prior to their expiration in 2026, along with what (if any) additional changes might be necessary to prevent future shortages.

Congressional Role
Congress plays a multifaceted role in federal management of the Colorado River Basin. Congress funds and oversees management of basin facilities and has held oversight hearings on drought in the basin and elsewhere. Congress also has enacted legislation involving allocation of Colorado River waters (e.g., authorization of Indian water rights settlements; new water storage facilities) and authorities to mitigate water shortages (i.e., the DCPs and other related efforts). In the future, Congress may be asked to amend or extend these authorities to combat long-term water shortages.

Skipping to the end..

500+ Plan
The Lower Basin DCP included a provision that if Reclamation’s modeling (which includes all of the aforementioned conservation efforts) indicates a possibility of Lake Mead reaching an elevation at or below 1,030 feet, the Secretary of the Interior and the Lower Basin states would consult on additional measures to avoid and protect Lake Mead declining below 1,020 feet. This provision was triggered in Reclamation’s August 2021 24-month study, which projected the possibility for such a scenario by 2023 under its “Probable Minimum Inflow” scenario. In response, Lower Basin parties and the DOI met and in December 2021 agreed on a new set of actions in a memorandum of understanding, known as the 500+ Plan. This plan calls for contributions of up to $100 million by Lower Basin users ($40 million from the Arizona Department of Water Resources and $20 million each from the Central Arizona Water Conservation District, the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, and the Southern Nevada Water Authority), plus another $100 million from the federal government, which collectively will result in the conservation of an additional 500,000 AF in Lake Mead in each of 2022 and 2023 (i.e., 1 MAF). Federal funding for these conservation efforts was made available through a combination of discretionary appropriations to Reclamation, as well as supplemental funding in the Infrastructure Improvement and Jobs Act (P.L. 117-58).

Issues for Congress

Funding and Oversight of Existing Facilities and Programs
The principal role of Congress as it relates to storage facilities on the Colorado River is funding and oversight of facility operations, construction, and programs to protect and restore endangered species (e.g., Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program and the Upper Colorado River Endangered Fish Program). In the Upper Basin, Colorado River facilities include the 17 active participating units in the Colorado River Storage Projects, as well as the Navajo-Gallup Water Supply Project. In the Lower Basin, major facilities include the Salt River Project and Theodore Roosevelt Dam, Hoover Dam and All-American Canal, Yuma and Gila Projects, Parker-Davis Project, Central Arizona Project, and Robert B. Griffith Project (now Southern Nevada Water System).

Congressional appropriations in support of Colorado River projects and programs typically account for a portion of overall project budgets. For example, for the most recent year available (FY2018), the Lower Colorado Region’s operating budget was $559.5 million; $134.8 million of this total was provided by discretionary appropriations, and the remainder of funding came from power revenues (which are made available without further appropriation) and nonfederal partners.103 In recent years, Congress has also authorized and appropriated funding that has targeted the Colorado River Basin in general (e.g., the Pilot System Conservation Plan). Congress may choose to extend or amend these and other authorities specific to the basin.

While discretionary appropriations for the Colorado River are of regular interest to Congress, Congress may also be asked to weigh in on Colorado River funding that is not subject to regular appropriations. For instance, in the coming years, the Lower Colorado River Basin Development Fund is projected to face a decrease in revenues104 and may thus have less funding available for congressionally established funding priorities for the Development Fund.

Tribal Water Rights Settlements and Leasing
Most tribal water rights are senior to other users and thus are likely to play an important role in the future of the Colorado River. As discussed, Congress has approved Indian water rights settlements associated with more than 2 MAF of tribal diversion rights on the Colorado River; a portion of this water has been developed to date. Congress may be asked to consider new settlements that would add to this total. At the same time, Congress may be asked to expand certain tribes’ ability to market their water rights to other basin water users. For instance, in the 117th Congress, S. 3308 would authorize the Colorado River Indian Tribes (CRIT) to enter into agreements to lease a portion of their Colorado River water rights. Currently, some tribes have the ability to lease their water, whereas others (such as CRIT) do not.

Plans for New and Augmented Water Storage, Conveyance
Some states in the Upper Basin have indicated their intent to further develop their Colorado River water entitlements. For example, in the 115th Congress, Section 4310 of America’s Water Infrastructure Act (P.L. 115-270) authorized the Secretary of the Interior to enter into an agreement with the State of Wyoming whereby the state would fund a project to add erosion control to Fontenelle Reservoir in the Upper Basin. The project would allow the state to potentially utilize an additional 80,000 acre-feet of water storage on the Green River, a tributary of the Colorado River.

Another project that would develop Upper Basin waters is the proposed Lake Powell Pipeline (LPP), which would direct approximately 86,000 acre-feet of Utah’s Upper Basin Colorado River Basin apportionment from Lake Powell to Washington County, UT (i.e., the St. George, UT, area, which is technically located within the Lower Basin drainage area). The pipeline would begin near Glen Canyon Dam in Arizona and would run through Arizona and Utah to Sand Hollow Reservoir near St. George, UT. Reclamation has been designated the lead agency for the project under NEPA and is coordinating an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for the most recently proposed version of the project. Supporters in Utah argue that the pipeline is needed to provide a second primary water source for the St. George area, in addition to the Virgin River. Some environmental groups have argued that the proposed development and diversion of additional Upper Basin waters is ill-advised in light of climate change and the basin’s issues with over-allocation. These groups have argued for major changes to the scope of the EIS. The six other Colorado River Basin states have raised concerns related to the proposed LPP’s “legal and operational issues,” and they have raised concerns with the LPP NEPA process as the de facto forum for resolving a conflict among basin states. The six states previously requested that Reclamation refrain from issuing a final EIS until these issues can be resolved on a consensus basis.

Drought Contingency Plan Implementation and Future Basin Agreements
Congress is likely to remain interested in the status of long-term drought in the basin and in the implementation of the DCPs and other related agreements, including their ability to stem further delivery curtailments and add water to the basin’s storage reservoirs. Congress also may be interested in broader basin planning, including new and existing efforts to plan for increased demand in the basin and stretch limited basin water supplies.

Federally led efforts to extend the 2007 Interim Guidelines (including the DCPs), which expire at the end of 2026, look to be the next major set of negotiations in the consensus-based management of the Colorado River. These “reconsultation” efforts, including any major changes to existing agreements, are seen as key to managing the basin’s future water resources. At the same time, new agreements that would protect water supplies in the short-term, such as the 500+ Plan, an Upper Basin Demand Management Program, and DROA Drought Plans, could themselves result in additional congressional involvement in funding, oversight, and/or enactment of new authorities.

Enjoy!

"I love when faculty complain on Twitter about rejections from journals. It’s so informative. Y’all are telling on yourselves and don’t even know it. We’ve adjusted your merit raises accordingly!" - @ass_deans

FMSO Monograph: 'Russian Deliberate River Crossings - Choreographing a Water Ballet'

A few days ago I heard a talking head on CNN or NPR speak about ill-prepared the Russians were for large river crossings in their was against Ukraine. So I decided to scan the FMSO monographs where I had seen a brief report on this topics just a while ago, written by Dr. Lester W. Grau.Sounds like the Russians know what they are doing. They must have left Dr. Grau's publication back in Russia. Or perhaps the talking heads had it all wrong,

I have posted his monograph below plus pasted in the first few pages, plus some graphics.

Download 2019-12-04 Russian Deliberate River Crossings (Grau) 

The Russian army is primarily a regional force, intended for employment in Eurasia; consequently, its equipment is designed specifically for that environment, which includes large expanses of woodlands and tundra intersected by broad rivers and massive swamps. Large rivers, canals, and lakes dominate Eurasia and have long served as major arteries of commerce and industry, defensive barriers, lines of communication, and avenues of advance. In central and eastern Europe, an advancing or withdrawing force can expect to encounter a 6-meter-wide water obstacle every 20 kilometers, up to a 100-meter-wide water obstacle every 35–60 kilometers, a 100- to 300-meterwide water obstacle every 100–150 kilometers, and a water obstacle more than 300 meters wide every 250–300 kilometers. Consequently, most vehicles used by Russian ground forces have some amphibious capability and can, at least, ford reasonable water obstacles. Troop carriers and infantry fighting vehicles are amphibious and can be propelled across the water using tracks or wheels for forward momentum.

Russian tanks can be driven across water obstacles of less than 5 meters deep and 1 kilometer wide using a snorkel to provide oxygen to the crew and engine. Weather and seasons also affect water crossing. Russia is a northern country, and severe winter weather is a normal condition for training and combat. Therefore, Russians regularly train to deal with crossings during spring and autumn flooding (with floating ice), under conditions of low water levels and high banks in summertime, and during winter freezes.

Bodies of water usually hinder and impair an attacking force but supplement the efforts of a defending force. The attacking force must suppress a ground defense force covering the crossing site and/or enemy aviation. The number and types of crossing sites depend on the nature of the water obstacle, the composition of the crossing forces, the available crossing means, and the intentions and laydown of the enemy force. The purpose of a crossing attack is to seize a lodgment on the far bank and penetrate enemy defenses. If tanks are unable to ford, they cross by submerged snorkeling or via ferries or pontoon bridges. Second-echelon forces, artillery, support vehicles, and follow-on forces cross on ferries and on pontoon bridges. 

Russians prefer to cross water obstacles from the march to avoid any major halts and massing of forces within enemy artillery range. Crossings are attempted at multiple points along a broad front in order to overwhelm enemy defenses and maintain tempo. The crossings are preferably conducted at night; however, this is difficult (and, in the case of tank snorkeling, forbidden). Particulate smoke and electronic masking are used extensively to cover assault crossings, particularly those conducted during daylight hours.

Russians train for two types of water crossings— unopposed and opposed. An unopposed (hasty) crossing is conducted against a lightly held enemy defense, and an opposed (deliberate) crossing is conducted against a prepared enemy defense.

A hasty water crossing involves the rapid crossing of forward combat forces with an accompanying air assault or an attack from the march to seize and secure a far shore bridgehead. The lead battalion pushes its main body across using amphibious vehicles with snorkels and quickly bridging or ferrying the remainder of the force to resume the offensive. Fording vehicles are more likely to be used in a hasty crossing than in a deliberate crossing because they allow the force to continue across the river without pausing to acquire other crossing means. The hasty crossing is discussed in the May– August 2018 issue of Engineer. When the enemy is defending the river with well-prepared defenses, much more force is required to overcome the defenses and a deliberate crossing is necessary.

A deliberate water crossing is conducted when an enemy has established sufficient defense to offer significant resistance to the crossing of a water obstacle. The deliberate crossing is considered the most important and complex part of an offensive action.5 It is generally conducted at a site where the enemy defense is weaker than general but still supports the overall scheme of maneuver. A deliberate crossing is normally conducted as an attack from the march. Should the initial attack fail or situations dictate, the main force may need to close on the water bank to prepare for the crossing. Should a Russian attack be stopped at the edge of the water, the deliberate crossing may be conducted by those stalled forces that are in contact or, preferably, by a follow-on force attacking from the march through the stalled Russian force (since tempo is easier to maintain than to initiate). Artillery support is essential for a deliberate crossing. Where possible, artillery is moved forward, where direct fire and low-trajectory fire can be provided.

The engineer battalion that is organic to the Russian maneuver brigade has four heavy mechanized bridge layer (TMM-3) or truck-mounted scissor-bridge (TMM-6) sets for bridging up to 40 meters and a PP-61 pontoon bridge capable of carrying 60 tons on a 268-meter bridge, 90 tons on a 165-meter bridge, or 120 tons on a 141-meter bridge. It takes less than an hour to emplace a PP-61 pontoon bridge. Six BMK-255-1 cutter vessels are used to help assemble and maintain the bridge position. The vessels can also serve as tugboats, should pontoon sections be used as ferries. The battalion also has seven PTS-2 tracked amphibious transports. Additional bridging assets are available at army level. The PMM-2M tracked amphibious bridging ferry has also been introduced into some engineer battalions. It can carry 42.5 tons and can be linked with other vehicles to form a bridge. A 210-meter-long PMM-2M bridge was constructed under fire across the Euphrates River in Syria in 2017. The bridge remained in position until February 2018, when it was dismantled by spring flooding.

The steps in conducting a deliberate river crossing are—

Step 1. Destroy the defending enemy, which is facing the water obstacle.

Step 2. Approach the water obstacle, and seize the crossing or far bridgehead by air assault and/or vehicle fording attack.

Step 3. Cross the main body using table of organization and equipment (TO&E) systems, and develop the offensive on the far shore.

Step 4. In the event that the offensive begins on the near shore, cross under cover of artillery and aviation support to break through the enemy defenses and develop the offensive into the depth and flanks of the enemy.

Coordinating a deliberate crossing requires—

■■ Choreography of artillery preparation and supporting fire

■■ Aviation strikes.

■■ Air assaults (to seize the far bank).

■■ An attack, from the march, that puts the first-echelon infantry fighting vehicles and/or personnel carriers on line shortly before reaching the near bank so that they can cross simultaneously.

■■ A separate tank crossing conducted by snorkeling or crossing on a pontoon bridge or on ferries.

■■ A camouflage and deception effort.

■■ A bridging effort.

■■ The development and continuation of the advance on the far shore.

The bridging effort requires—

■■ Engineer reconnaissance support.

■■ Crossing sites.

■■ Route selection.

■■ Construction.

■■ Traffic control.

■■ Vehicle and casualty evacuation.

■■ Mine clearing.

■■ Camouflage.

■■ The continuation of the attack (and the next water obstacle).

The goal of river crossing is to maintain the tempo of the attack—not to stall on the near or far bank. Air defense assets are positioned forward to provide cover for hasty and deliberate crossings to prevent aerial interdiction of vehicles on or in the river, where they are most vulnerable. The initial attack is conducted by air assault and/or motorized rifle forces crossing the water with wheeled infantry personnel carriers (similar to the Stryker) or tracked infantry fighting vehicles (similar to the Bradley) firing onboard weapons as they cross. Air support during the crossing of a water obstacle often varies from the standard Russian airborne and air assault pattern. Russian airborne and air assault forces are 100 percent mechanized, and infantry carriers, artillery, and support vehicles accompany the assault. The airborne or air assault force usually drops some distance from the objective, assembles, mounts its vehicles, and conducts a march and mounted attack against the objective. This may not be possible in a company or battalion size parachute drop or air assault, and many vehicles may need to join the force later. Consequently, the main force should cross and link up with the company or battalion size air assault force within 2 hours of insertion.

Read on!

Enjoy!

“A deliberate water crossing is conducted when an enemy has established sufficient defense to offer significant resistance to the crossing of a water obstacle.” - Dr. Lester W. Grau

CRS Report: 'Central Valley Project - Issues and Legislation' Updated: 8 March 2022

From Charles V. Stern, Pervaze A. Sheikh and Erin H. Ward comes this updated (8 March 2022) version of the CRS report: 'Central Valley Project - Issues and Legislation'.

Download CRS_Report_CVP_Issues_Legislation_8March2022

This report gets updated on a regular basis. Click on the graphics to enlarge them.

Summary
The Central Valley Project (CVP), a federal water project owned and operated by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation), is one of the world’s largest water supply projects. The CVP covers approximately 400 miles in California, from Redding to Bakersfield, and draws from two large river basins: the Sacramento and the San Joaquin. It is composed of 20 dams and reservoirs and numerous pieces of water storage and conveyance infrastructure. In an average year, the CVP delivers more than 7 million acre-feet of water to support irrigated agriculture, municipalities, and fish and wildlife needs, among other purposes. About 75% of CVP water is used for agricultural irrigation, including 7 of California’s top 10 agricultural counties. The CVP is operated jointly with the State Water Project (SWP), which provides much of its water to municipal users in Southern California.

CVP water is delivered to users that have contracts with Reclamation, which is part of the Department of the Interior. These contractors receive varying levels of priority for water deliveries based on several factors, including hydrology, water rights, prior agreements with Reclamation, and regulatory requirements. The Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers’ confluence with the San Francisco Bay (Bay-Delta or Delta) is a hub for CVP water deliveries; many CVP contractors south of the Delta receive water that is “exported” from north of the Delta.

Development of the CVP resulted in significant changes to the area’s natural hydrology. However, construction of most CVP facilities predated major federal natural resources and environmental protection laws. Much of the current debate related to the CVP revolves around how to deal with changes to the hydrologic system that were not significantly mitigated when the project was constructed. Dry conditions—including a prolonged drought from 2012 to 2016 and the current drought, which dates to 2020—have led to curtailment of contracted water supplies. Reclamation has been unable to provide any water supplies to most CVP agricultural water service contractors in 4 of the past 11 years (including 2021 and 2022) and has cut supplies for some senior water rights holders during this time.

Various state and federal proposals are currently under consideration and have generated controversy for their potential to affect CVP operations and allocations. In late 2018, the State of California finalized revisions to its Bay-Delta Water Quality Control Plan that would require more flows from the San Joaquin and Sacramento Rivers to reach the Bay-Delta for water quality and fish and wildlife enhancement (i.e., reduced water supplies for other users). “Voluntary agreements” that might replace some or all of these requirements are currently being negotiated but have yet to be finalized. Concurrently, the Trump Administration attempted to increase CVP water supplies for users and made changes to long-term operations of the CVP in a 2019 biological opinion created under the Endangered Species Act (ESA, 16 U.S.C. §§1531-1544). California and some environmental organizations opposed these efforts and filed lawsuits to prevent implementation of the changes. The court issued a preliminary injunction on May 11, 2020, temporarily prohibiting Reclamation from implementing the operational changes through May 31, 2020 (an extension was denied by the court). On September 30, 2021, Reclamation requested reinitiation of consultation with the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) to assess the effects of proposed changes to CVP operations and to voluntarily reconcile CVP operations with SWP operational requirements under the California ESA permit. Reclamation and California submitted to the court a proposed revised interim operations plan for the October 1, 2021, to September 30, 2022, water year while reinitiated consultation is ongoing. Other parties to the litigation have raised objections to the plan. Reclamation and California submitted motions requesting adoption of the interim operations plan and a stay of the litigation through September 30, 2022.

Congress has engaged in CVP issues through oversight and legislation, most recently in the form of provisions enacted under the 2016 Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation Act (WIIN Act; P.L. 114-322). Among other things, this act authorized changes to CVP operations that are intended to provide increased water supplies for agricultural and municipal contractors under certain circumstances. In the same legislation, Congress also authorized funding for new water storage projects that are expected to benefit CVP operations. In the 117th Congress, legislators may consider bills and conduct oversight on efforts to increase CVP water exports compared with current baselines. Some in Congress have also weighed in on disagreements between state and federal project operators and the status of coordinated operations of the CVP and SWP. Congress is also considering whether to approve funding for new water storage projects and may consider legislation to extend or amend CVP authorities.

Introduction
The Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation), part of the Department of the Interior (DOI), operates the multipurpose federal Central Valley Project (CVP) in California, one of the world’s largest water storage and conveyance systems. The CVP runs approximately 400 miles in California, from Redding to Bakersfield (Figure 1). It supplies water to hundreds of thousands of acres of irrigated agriculture throughout the state, including some of the most valuable cropland in the country. It also provides water to selected state and federal wildlife refuges, as well as to some municipal and industrial (M&I) water users. The CVP’s operations are coordinated with the state’s other largest water supply project, the state-operated State Water Project (SWP).

This report provides information on hydrologic conditions in California and their impact on state and federal water management, with a focus on deliveries related to the federal CVP. It also summarizes selected issues for Congress related to the CVP.

Recent Developments
The drought of 2012-2016, widely considered to be among California’s most severe droughts in recent history, resulted in major reductions to CVP contractor allocations and economic and environmental impacts throughout the state. These impacts were of interest to Congress, which oversees federal operation of the CVP. Although the drought ended with the wet winter of 2017, dry conditions in 2020 and 2021 (the driest water year on record since 1977) have resulted in renewed water supply curtailments. Absent major changes to existing hydrologic, legislative, and regulatory baselines, most agree that at least some water users are likely to face constrained water supplies in water year 2022. Due to the limited available water supplies, proposed changes to the current operations and allocation system are controversial.

Because of the relative scarcity of water in the West and the importance of federal water infrastructure to the region, western water issues are regularly of interest to many lawmakers. Legislation enacted in the 114th Congress (Title II of the Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation [WIIN] Act; P.L. 114-322) included several CVP-related sections. These provisions directed pumping to “maximize” water supplies for the CVP (including pumping or “exports” to CVP water users south of the Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers’ confluence with the San Francisco Bay, known as the Bay-Delta or Delta) in accordance with applicable biological opinions (BiOps) for project operations. They also allowed for increased pumping during certain storm events generating high flows, authorized actions to facilitate water transfers, and established a new standard for measuring the effects of water operations on species. In addition tooperational provisions, the WIIN Act authorized funding for construction of new federal and nonfederal water storage projects. CVP projects are among the most likely recipients of this funding.

Due to increased precipitation and disagreements with the state, among other factors, the WIIN Act’s operational authorities generally did not yield significant new water exports south of the Delta in 2017-2020. However, Reclamation received funding for WIIN Act-authorized water storage project design and construction in FY2017-FY2021, and the majority of this funding has gone to CVP-related projects.

Separate state and federal plans under the Clean Water Act and Endangered Species Act, respectively, would alter water allocation and operational criteria in markedly different ways and have generated controversy. In mid-2018, the State of California proposed revisions to its Bay-Delta Water Quality Control Plan (developed pursuant to the Clean Water Act [CWA; 33 U.S.C. §§1251-138]). These changes would require that more flows from the San Joaquin and Sacramento Rivers reach the California Bay-Delta for water quality and fish and wildlife enhancement (and would thus further reduce water supplies for CVP and SWP users). Separately, in February 2020, the Trump Administration finalized an operational plan to increase water supplies for users and issued a new biological opinion under the Endangered Species Act (ESA; 16 U.S.C. §§1531-1544) that reflects these changes. Both plans are the subject of ongoing litigation. On September 30, 2021, Reclamation requested reinitiation of consultation with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) under Section 7 of the ESA to address proposed changes to CVP operations and to voluntarily reconcile CVP operations to SWP operational requirements imposed by the permit issued pursuant to the California ESA. Reclamation and California proposed an interim operations plan for CVP and SWP operations during the October 1, 2021, to September 30, 2022, water year while reinitiated consultation is ongoing. Other parties to the litigation have objected to the interim operations plan. On November 23, 2021, the federal defendants requested that the court approve a voluntary remand of the 2019 BiOps and 2020 record of decision (ROD) without vacating them and require implementation of the interim operations plan as injunctive relief through September 30, 2022.

Let's cut to the chase, shall we?

New Storage and Conveyance

Reductions in available water deliveries due to hydrological and regulatory factors have caused some stakeholders, legislators, and state and federal government officials to look at other methods of augmenting water supplies. In particular, proposals to build new or augmented CVP and/or SWP water storage projects have been of interest to some policymakers. Additionally, the State of California is pursuing a major water conveyance project, the California WaterFix, with a nexus to CVP operations.

New and Augmented Water Storage Projects
The aforementioned CALFED legislation (P.L. 108-361) authorized the study of several new or augmented storage projects throughout the Central Valley that have been ongoing for a number of years. Additionally, a number of other projects in and around the Central Valley have beenproposed in recent years. While it is unclear whether any of these projects will be completed and/or incorporated into the CVP itself, their status has ramifications for the water supply questions related to the CVP. In the past, construction recommendations for new Reclamation projects have been subject to congressional approval; however, Section 4007 of the WIIN Act authorized Reclamation financial support for new or expanded federal and nonfederal water storage projects and provided that these projects could be deemed authorized, subject to a finding by the Administration that individual projects met certain criteria. As of the date of this report’s publication, most recommendations under this authority had been approved in appropriations acts, with the only exception being proposed funding for the Shasta Dam and Reservoir Enlargement Project, which has appeared in the most recent three project recommendation lists. Table 4 shows recent funding levels for these projects.

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