WaterWired

CRS InFocus Report: 'The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) - Background and FY2025 Appropriations'

From Anna E. Normand CRS looks to FY2025: 'The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS): Background and FY2025 Appropriations'

Download IF12620: The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) - Background and FY2025 Appropriations.'

Background
The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), in the Department of the Interior (DOI), provides scientific information to support the management of water, energy, mineral, ecosystem, and land resources and to mitigate risks from natural hazards. The USGS also collects long-term data to understand and report on the Earth’s geologic and ecosystem processes, using satellite imagery, mapping, and ground-based instruments. The USGS has no regulatory authority and does not manage federal lands.

Congress created the USGS in 1879 in the USGS Organic Act (43 U.S.C. §31). The USGS Organic Act defined the initial scope of the USGS:

The Director of the USGS] shall have the direction of the United States Geological Survey, and the classification of the public lands and examination of the geological structure, mineral resources, and products of the national domain.

Since 1879, Congress has expanded the USGS’s statutory authority to “such examinations outside the national domain where determined by the Secretary [of the Interior] to be in the national interest.” This expansion has included activities related to water resources, ecosystems, and natural hazards that span the globe. The USGS conducts scientific activities under interdisciplinary mission areas, and each mission area has its own budget line (see Table 1 for the mission areas). The USGS also has budget lines for Science Support (administrative activities and information) and Facilities. Congress typically appropriates funds for the USGS through annual Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriations acts.

FY2025 Budget Request
The President’s budget request for USGS appropriations in FY2025 is $1.578 billion, $122.9 million more than FY2024 annual appropriations of $1.455 billion provided by Division of E of P.L. 118-42 (an 8% increase; Figure 1). For FY2024, the President requested a 19% increase over FY2023 annual appropriations of $1.497 billion. The FY2024 annual appropriation provided a 3% decrease compared with FY2023 annual appropriations.

The Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA; P.L. 117- 58) provided the USGS supplemental appropriations of $510.7 million, $69.0 million of which are first made available in FY2025. This total includes $64.0 million for the Earth Mapping Resource Initiative (Earth MRI) and $5.0 million for the National Geological and Geophysical Data Preservation Program. The IIJA funding for the USGS is to support scientific studies that address critical mineral information and geological data preservation.

Figure 1. USGS Annual Appropriations, FY2020-FY2024, and FY2025 Budget Request (in millions)

The following sections summarize USGS mission areas and selected programs in the FY2025 budget request.

Ecosystems Mission Area
The Ecosystems mission area conducts biological and ecological science to inform natural resource management decisions through five programs and cooperative research units. The FY2025 budget requests a 9% increase above the FY2024 enacted level for this mission area. The largest program increase for the mission area is for the Land Management Research Program, requested at $60.6 million for FY2025 compared with $52.0 million enacted for FY2024. The increase includes supporting science for mapping corridors of big game hunting populations and for drought response. The budget request proposes decreases for some activities in the mission area, including a decrease of $1.0 million for the Biological Threats and Invasive Species Research Program. It proposes to separate the land change science component of the Climate Adaptation Science Centers and Land Change Science Program into a stand-alone program named the Ecosystems Change Research Program to ensure “program and budget clarity.”

Energy and Mineral Resources Mission Area
The Energy and Mineral Resources mission area includes scientific research and assessments related to energy and minerals. The FY2025 budget requests a 19% increase above the FY2024 enacted level for the mission area. For the Energy Resources Program, the budget requests an increase of $7.1 million above the FY2024 enacted level of $32.6 million, which includes supporting activities related to geologic carbon sequestration and geothermal energy. For the Mineral Resources Program, the budget requests an increase of $12.1 million above the FY2023 enacted level of $68.7 million, which includes supporting critical minerals supply chain analysis and forecasting. The request also proposes to restructure the Mineral Resources Program into two components: the National Minerals Information Center and Mineral Resources Research, Surveys, and Assessments. The USGS asserts that the restructuring would increase budget transparency for the National Minerals Information Center. The agency anticipates requesting that the U.S. Chief Statistician within the Office of Management and Budget designate the center as a Recognized Statistical Unit (see 44 U.S.C. §3563).

Natural Hazards Mission Area
The Natural Hazards mission area provides scientific information to reduce losses from natural hazards. The FY2025 budget requests a 6% increase above the FY2024 enacted level for the mission area. This increase includes a $7.3 million increase for the Coastal and Marine Hazards and Resources Program to support research to inform climate-related risk assessments, among other activities. It also includes a $2.2 million increase for both the Earthquake Hazards Program and the Volcano Hazards Program. The budget requests decreased funding for some activities in the mission area, including a decrease of $0.4 million for the Landslide Hazards Program.

Water Resources Mission Area
The Water Resources mission area monitors water resources and researches water processes. The FY2025 budget requests a 7% increase above the FY2024 enacted level for the mission area. This includes increased funding for Integrated Water Availability Assessments, federal priority streamgages, and the National Groundwater Quality Network. Similar to past budget requests, the Administration requests eliminating the Water Resources Research Act Program, a federal-state partnership that conducts regional water research. The budget also requests decreases for some activities in the mission area.

Core Science Systems Mission Area
The Core Science Systems mission area generally focuses on the USGS’s mapping activities and supports science across the agency. The mission area includes the National Land Imaging Program, which operates Landsat satellites, among other activities. The FY2025 budget requests a 15% increase above the FY2024 enacted level for the mission area. This includes an increase of $28.7 million for the National Land Imaging Program, which would support Landsat activities, including Landsat Next development, and a commercial data pilot program. The FY2025 budget also requests increases for a high performance computing initiative to advance USGS science data delivery, particularly for drought and fire science, and for an American conservation and stewardship atlas. The budget request also proposes decreases for some activities in the mission area, including a decrease of $3.4 million for the National Geospatial Program.

Science Support and Facilities Budget Lines
The Science Support budget line includes funding to provide business services and information technology management to operate USGS science programs. The FY2025 budget requests a 13% increase above the FY2024 enacted level for the budget line, which includes supporting USGS laboratories and zero-emissions vehicles. The Facilities budget line includes funding for rent, facility operations and maintenance, and deferred maintenance and repair. The FY2025 budget requests a 2% decrease from the FY2024 enacted level for the budget line. Under the budget line, the USGS proposes to change the name for the sub- activity “Deferred Maintenance and Capital Improvement” to “Facilities Maintenance, Modernization, and Restoration” to standardize DOI terms and definitions.

Issues for Congress
Congress may evaluate the President’s request for a total increase of 8% for the USGS compared with FY2024 annual appropriations, as well as proposed increases and decreases for various activities. Congress also may weigh the IIJA supplemental appropriations provided for FY2024 and advance appropriations for FY2025 ($69.0 million each) when deliberating on discretionary funding for various activities that are funded by the IIJA. Further, Congress may consider whether to fund specific requests from Members in FY2025. For example, P.L. 118-42 funded $5.2 million in congressionally directed spending items, also known as earmarks, for the USGS in FY2024. Congress also may consider the reorganization and renaming proposals related to the USGS in the FY2025 budget request.

Note: I have added the FY2024 document, also by Anna E. Normand:

Download CRS_InFocus Rpt_USGS_Background_FY2024_Apprp__27March2024

Enjoy!

"How did we come up with the college’s new mission phrase? We surveyed the students and faculty, made a word cloud of responses, and picked the three biggest words!" - @ass_deans

CRS InFocus Report: 'Baltimore Bridge Collapse - Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)"

One thing I love about CRS reports: they don't waste any time. Here is the two-pager by John Frittelli and Ben Goldman (26 March 2024):Baltimore Bridge Collapse: FAQ. Thia will be updated.

Download: Download CRS_InFocus_Report_ Baltimore_Bridge_Collapse_FAQ_26March2024

At about 1:30 a.m. on March 26, 2024, the MV Dali, a container ship departing the Port of Baltimore, struck a support tower of the Francis Scott Key Bridge in Baltimore, MD, causing the bridge to collapse into the Patapsco River. The bridge is a segment of Interstate 695—Baltimore’s beltway—and spans over the Patapsco shipping channel into the harbor. 

A pothole repair crew was on the bridge at the time of the collision. There were 22 crew members aboard the ship, but none sustained death or injury. Seven submerged vehicles have been identified thus far, but more are possible. There have been no reports of oil spills from the ship. 

Who Is Conducting Search and Rescue Operations? 
As of the afternoon of March 26, 2024, a search and rescue operation is underway for people who were traveling over and working on the bridge when it collapsed. The U.S. Coast Guard is the primary federal agency that conducts maritime search and rescue operations; it does so in conjunction with state and local authorities. A key federal official in charge is the local Coast Guard Captain of the Port for Maryland-National Capital Region. 

Who Owns and Controls the Ship? 
The Dali is being chartered (leased) by Maersk, a Danish shipping firm that provides container shipping services worldwide in addition to other types of shipping. The ship is managed by the Synergy Group and owned by Grace Ocean Private Ltd., both based in Singapore. The ship’s crew are from India. It is flagged and homeported in Singapore and was “classed” (meaning certified as meeting construction and maintenance standards) by a Japanese firm, Nippon Kaiji Kyokai (Class NK). The multitude of nationalities involved in operating and administering the ship is typical of the industry. 

The ship was built in 2015 by Hyundai Heavy Industries in South Korea (IMO identification number 9697428). It is almost 950 feet in length and about 160 feet in breadth with a capacity to carry 10,000 TEUs of containers (a TEU is a 20-foot container). It could be considered an average-sized container ship today but would be considered a large ship compared with the fleet in the late 1970s when the bridge was built. The ship had sailed from Asia through the Panama Canal and had called at Norfolk and New York before its Baltimore port call. When it struck the bridge, the ship was departing Baltimore for Sri Lanka. 

How Do Ships Navigate Through Harbors?
A preliminary report stated that the ship lost power twice as it was approaching the bridge, meaning the ship may have lost engine power. Reportedly, two Baltimore harbor pilots were aboard the ship; harbor pilots navigate ships in and out of harbors because they have expertise with local navigation conditions. Even when harbor pilots are at the helm, the captain of the ship and the shipping line (Maersk) remain responsible for the safety of the vessel. Tugs typically assist in moving ships into and out of their berths (docking and undocking), and some tugs escort ships through harbors as an emergency safety measure. Reportedly, this ship released the tugs before reaching the bridge as is normal in the harbor. 

How Will Port Traffic Be Affected? 
The Port of Baltimore was the 17th busiest port by total tonnage in the United States in 2021, the most recent year for which data are available. It was the 10th busiest by dry bulk tonnage and the 15th busiest container port in TEUs. According to the Maryland Port Administration, the port ranks first among the nation’s ports for autos and light truck volume, roll on/roll off farm and construction machinery, and imported gypsum. It is also responsible for nearly $3.3 billion in personal wages and salaries, $2.6 billion in business revenue, and nearly $400 million in state and local tax revenue annually. 

Containers currently at the port awaiting export could be moved to other ports by truck or rail; one of the Port of Baltimore’s two container terminals is served by on-dock rail access. Dry bulk—such as coal, the largest commodity by volume handled by the port—and roll on/roll off may be more difficult to move through other ports, as specialized facilities are needed for loading and unloading. The closest large ports to Baltimore are Wilmington, DE, Philadelphia, PA, and Camden, NJ, all of which may be accessed via the Chesapeake and Delaware Canal provided the vessels have a shallow enough draft. Another nearby port, not draft restricted, is the port of Norfolk near the entrance to Chesapeake Bay. 

Currently, commercial vessels are unable to enter or exit the Port of Baltimore. Also, the U.S. Coast Guard shipyard at Hawkins Point is upriver from the bridge, and six vessels of the U.S. Department of Transportation’s Ready Reserve Force (available to provide surge sealift capacity to the Department of Defense, if needed) were berthed in Baltimore as of January 2024 and presumably are currently unable to exit the port. 

How Much Traffic Did the Key Bridge Handle? 
The Key Bridge first opened to traffic in 1977, spanning the Patapsco River connecting Interstate 695 on the southeastern side of Baltimore (see Figure 1). It had annual average daily traffic of 33,195 vehicles in 2022 and an annual average weekday traffic of 38,014 vehicles. It was less heavily used than the Fort McHenry and Baltimore Harbor Tunnels running under the Patapsco River further north. While part of the Interstate Highway System, it is not part of the federally designated Primary Highway Freight System. 

Highway traffic could be rerouted through the Baltimore Harbor or Fort McHenry Tunnels or on Interstate 695 to the north of Baltimore City. Some larger vehicles, including all double-trailers, and most shipments of hazardous materials are not permitted in the tunnels, and trucks are not allowed through the Baltimore Harbor tunnel. See Figure 1 for a map of transportation facilities around Baltimore. 

Has Anything Like This Happened Before?
In May 1980, the bulk freighter MV Summit Venture struck a support column of the Sunshine Skyway Bridge inTampa, FL, causing a large portion of the bridge span to collapse and resulting in 35 fatalities. Federal investigators concluded that the probable cause of the collision was unexpectedly sudden and severe weather. Because only one of two parallel spans collapsed, traffic could resume at reduced capacity on the remaining span until a replacement bridge was completed in 1987. Other bridges have collapsed leading to disruptions in maritime and highway transportation as well.

What Actions Can the Federal Government Take?
The U.S. Coast Guard shares responsibilities with the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) to investigate major safety incidents. Under the NTSB’s governing statutes and regulations, the agency shall investigate any “major marine casualty,” defined as one that results in the loss of six or more lives, the loss of a vessel larger than 100 gross tons, property damage initially estimated as at least $0.5 million, or a release of hazardous materials deemed to be a serious threat. The U.S. Coast Guard is directed to conduct a preliminary investigation to determine whether a major marine casualty event has occurred and notify the NTSB accordingly. The NTSB report for the Florida Skyway Bridge Collapse was published 11 months after the incident occurred, and the collapse of the Fern Hollow Bridge near Pittsburgh in 2022 took two years for the agency to fully investigate.

In other bridge collapses, such as the 2007 I-35 collapse in Minneapolis, state and federal highway departments led the removal and cleanup from the federal navigation channel. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is prepared to provide survey capabilities and has some local debris removal capabilities, as well as contract capability if requested and needed.

Enjoy!

"You don’t command wind in the direction it blows, but you command a ship in the direction it sails.” ― Matshona Dhliwayo

CRS InFocus Report: 'U.S.-Mexico-Canada (USMCA) Trade Agreement' Updated: 5 March 2024

Where's NAFTA? Gone! This CRS InFocus Report was updated (5 March 2024) by M. Angeles Villarreal,CRS InFocus Report: 'U.S.-Mexico-Canada (USMCA) Trade Agreement': U.S.-Mexico-Canada (USMCA) Trade Agreement

Download IF10997: U.S.-Mexico-Canada (USMCA) Trade Agreement

 Click on the graphics to expand them.

 Overview
The 118th Congress, in both legislative and oversight capacities, may be active in numerous trade policy issues related to the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), which entered into force on July 1, 2020 (see CRS Report R44981, The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA)). USMCA replaced the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Congress approved implementing legislation for USMCA in December 2019 (P.L. 116-113). 

 

 

After the initial USMCA was concluded in 2018, some Members of Congress expressed concern over certain key provisions and negotiated with USTR to amend the agreement. On December 10, 2019, the United States, Canada, and Mexico agreed to a protocol of amendment to the original USMCA text. The revisions include modifications regarding dispute settlement, labor and environmental provisions, intellectual property rights (IPR) protection, and motor vehicle industry rules of origin. The revised agreement provides for a facility-specific “rapid response” labor mechanism, which has been used by the U.S. Department of Labor and USTR to protect worker rights in numerous. The first USMCA panel hearing under this mechanism took place on February 28 and 29, 2024. The outcome is pending. 

 Key Provisions 

USMCA, composed of 34 chapters and 12 side letters, retains most of NAFTA’s chapters, making notable changes to market access provisions for autos and agriculture products, to rules on investment, government procurement, and intellectual property rights (IPR), and to provisions regarding labor and the environment. New provisions such as digital trade, state-owned enterprises, and currency misalignment are part of the new agreement. 

Market Access 

Motor Vehicles. NAFTA phased out tariffs on motor vehicle trade among the three countries, subject to specific rules-of-origin (ROO) requirements (see Table 1). USMCA tightened these rules by including the following. 

• • New motor vehicle ROO and procedures, including product-specific rules and requiring 75% North American content. 
• • Wage requirement that 40%-45% of auto content be made by workers earning at least $16 an hour. 
• • Requirement that 70% of a vehicle’s steel and aluminum must originate in North America; steel be melted and poured in North America. 
• • Streamlining of ROO certification enforcement 

Key Provisions 
USMCA, composed of 34 chapters and 12 side letters, retains most of NAFTA’s chapters, making notable changes to market access provisions for autos and agriculture products, to rules on investment, government procurement, and intellectual property rights (IPR), and to provisions regarding labor and the environment. New provisions such as digital trade, state-owned enterprises, and currency misalignment are part of the new agreement. 

Market Access 

Motor Vehicles. NAFTA phased out tariffs on motor vehicle trade among the three countries, subject to specific rules-of-origin (ROO) requirements (see Table 1). USMCA tightened these rules by including the following. 

Dairy. USMCA increased U.S. dairy access to Canada’s dairy market, but it does not dismantle Canada’s supply-management system. Canada also removed its “Class 7” pricing for ultra-high filtration (UHF) milk. In return, the United States expanded import quota levels for Canadian dairy and sugar products. 

Dispute Settlement 
USMCA maintains the NAFTA state-to-state mechanism for most disputes arising under the agreement and retains the binational dispute settlement mechanism to review trade remedy disputes. New provisions prevent panel blocking by ensuring the formation of a dispute settlement panel. On investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS), which is a form of binding arbitration that allows private investors to pursue claims against sovereign nations, provisions were eliminated for Canada. For Mexico, ISDS remains in place for government contracts in the oil, natural gas, power generation, infrastructure, and telecommunications sectors, and in other sectors if national remedies are exhausted first. 

Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) 
NAFTA was the first free trade agreement (FTA) to include an IPR chapter. USMCA retains core protections for copyrights, patents, exclusivity periods for test data, trade secrets, trademarks, and geographical indications, as well as specific enforcement requirements. The revised USMCA removes provisions on biologic data protection, among other changes. USMCA provisions include: 

new binding obligations on currency misalignment. 

prohibitions on circumvention of technological protection measures; 

criminal and civil penalties protections for trade secret theft, including by state-owned enterprises and cyber-theft; and 

copyright safe-harbor provisions. 

Energy
USMCA removed NAFTA’s energy chapter, while adding a new chapter with provisions recognizing Mexico’s constitution and the Mexican government’s direct ownership of hydrocarbons. U.S. investors in the energy sector, however, appear to remain protected by similar provisions as those in NAFTA. In 2022, the United States and Canada launched USMCA disputes against Mexico and are in state-to-state consultations over policies by Mexico’s president to undo some of the 2013 market opening energy reforms. Mexico has provided proposals to resolve concerns, but the dispute may be challenging to resolve. 

Labor and Environment 
USMCA revised NAFTA and incorporates provisions to provide expanded provisions for labor and environment issues. USMCA requires parties to 

• • Adopt, maintain, enforce, and not derogate from statutes and regulation regarding the International Labor Organization (ILO) Declaration of Rights at Work. 
• • Adopt, maintain, enforce, and not derogate from environmental laws, including seven multilateral environment agreements. 

USMCA has new provisions that shift the burden of proof to the responding party so that a complaint affects trade and investment unless otherwise demonstrated. USMCA also includes a new rapid response mechanism for worker rights complaints at covered facilities, Mexican labor reform monitoring, creation of a new interagency committee on labor with reporting requirements to Congress, and enhanced anti-worker violence and forced labor provisions. 

Government Procurement (GP)
NAFTA set standards and parameters for government purchases of goods and services and opportunities for firms of each nation to bid on certain contracts for specified government agencies above a set monetary threshold on a reciprocal basis. The USMCA provisions only apply to U.S.-Mexico procurement, while Canada remains covered by the more recent and comprehensive World Trade Organization Government Procurement Agreement (GPA). However, the monetary threshold for the GPA is higher at $180,000 as compared to NAFTA’s $25,000. 

E-Commerce, Data Flows, and Data Localization 
The USMCA has new digital trade provisions, including prohibiting customs duties on electronically transmitted products and limits on source code disclosure requirements, and broad provisions on cross-border data flows and restrictions on data localization requirements. 

Other Key USMCA Provisions 

• • New binding obligations on currency misalignment. 
• • A sunset clause requiring a joint review and agreement on renewal at year 6; in lieu of mutual agreement at the time, USMCA would expire 16 years later. 
• • A new chapter on State-Owned Enterprises (SOE). 
• • De minimis customs threshold for duty free treatment set at $117 for Canada and Mexico. Tax-free threshold set at $50 for Mexico and C$40 for Canada. 
• • Allowing a party to withdraw from the agreement if another party enters into an FTA with a country it deems to be a nonmarket economy (e.g., China). 

Issues for Congress
Some issues for Congress include 

• • Preparing for the formal trilateral six-year review of USMCA in 2026 in which the parties will decide whether to extend the agreement for another 16 years. 
• • Monitoring of USMCA disputes on energy, biotechnology and corn, labor, and tariff-rate quotas. 
• • Oversight of the effective implementation of the new motor vehicle rules of origin and the effect on the U.S. motor vehicle industry as the industry adapts to the more complex rules. 
• • Monitoring USMCA rules of origin in the context of increasing competition from Chinese manufacturers in the motor vehicle industry and the possible movement of Chinese companies to Mexico to avoid U.S. tariffs. 

Enjoy!

"Speak when you are angry and you will make the best speech you will ever regret." - Ambrose Bierce (quoted in @TIME via @TheWeek)

CRS Report: 'Central Valley Project: Issues and Legislation' (Updated: 5 March 2024)

This CRS report (updated 5 March 2024) by Charles V. Stern, Pervaze A. Sheikh and Erin H. Ward is excellent and one of the most important water issues in California and the Western US. Click here for the PDF: Central Valley Project: Issues and Legislation.

Download CRS_Report-_Central_Valley_Project_Issues_Legislation_5March2024

I will not go through the entire report here. I will reproduce the Summary and insert a few graphics. Be sure to read the Introduction, Background and Recent Developments. Click on the graphics to enlarge them.

Summary

The Central Valley Project (CVP), a federal water project owned and operated by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation), is one of the world’s largest water supply projects. The CVP covers approximately 400 miles in California, from Redding to Bakersfield, and draws from two large river basins: the Sacramento and the San Joaquin. It is composed of 20 dams and reservoirs and numerous pieces of water storage and conveyance infrastructure. In an average year, the CVP delivers more than 7 million acre-feet of water to support irrigated agriculture, municipalities, and fish and wildlife needs, among other purposes. About 75% of CVP water is used for agricultural irrigation, including 7 of California’s top 10 agricultural counties. The CVP is operated jointly with the State Water Project (SWP), which provides much of its water to municipal users in Southern California.

CVP water is delivered to users that have contracts with Reclamation, which is part of the Department of the Interior. These contractors receive varying levels of priority for water deliveries based on several factors, including hydrology, water rights, prior agreements with Reclamation, and regulatory requirements. The Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers’ confluence with the San Francisco Bay (Bay-Delta or Delta) is a hub for CVP water deliveries; many CVP contractors south of the Delta receive water that is “exported” from north of the Delta.

Development of the CVP resulted in significant changes to the area’s natural hydrology. However, construction of most CVP facilities predated major federal natural resources and environmental protection laws. Much of the current debate related to the CVP revolves around how to deal with changes to the hydrologic system that were not significantly mitigated when the project was constructed. Dry conditions have led to significant curtailments of contracted water supplies in recent years. Reclamation has been unable to provide any water supplies to most CVP agricultural water service contractors in 4 of the past 11 years (including 2021 and 2022) and has cut supplies for some senior water rights holders during this time. Wet conditions in the winter of 2022-2023 alleviated some of these trends.

Various state and federal proposals are currently under consideration and have generated controversy for their potential to affect CVP operations and allocations. In late 2018, the State of California finalized revisions to its Bay-Delta Water Quality Control Plan that would require more flows from the San Joaquin and Sacramento Rivers to reach the Bay-Delta for water quality and fish and wildlife enhancement (i.e., reduced water supplies for other users). Voluntary agreements that might replace some or all of these requirements are being negotiated but have not been finalized. The Trump Administration attempted to increase CVP water supplies for users and proposed changes to long-term operations of the CVP in 2019. Those changes were finalized in a record of decision in 2020 after the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) issued a no-jeopardy biological opinion after consultation required by the Endangered Species Act (ESA; 16 U.S.C. §§1531-1544). California and some environmental organizations opposed these efforts and filed lawsuits to prevent implementation of the changes. The court issued a preliminary injunction on May 11, 2020, temporarily prohibiting Reclamation from implementing the operational changes. Under the Biden Administration, Reclamation is implementing an interim operations plan for the CVP while the litigation is pending and has requested reinitiation of consultation with FWS and NMFS to assess the effects of proposed changes to CVP operations.

Congress has engaged in CVP issues through oversight and legislation, most recently in the form of provisions enacted under the 2016 Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation Act (WIIN Act; P.L. 114-322). Among other things, this act authorized changes to CVP operations that were intended to provide increased water supplies for agricultural and municipal contractors under certain circumstances (most of these provisions have since expired). In the same legislation, Congress authorized funding for new water storage projects that are expected to benefit CVP operations. Some of these operational and construction-related provisions expired but have been proposed for reauthorization. Legislators may conduct oversight on the CVP and may consider legislation that aims to alter CVP water exports compared with current levels, as well as whether to approve funding for new water storage projects.

Enjoy!

"If women were happy, the scented candle industry would tank." - Writer Lyz Lenz, quoted in Slate

CRS InFocus Report: Iran-Supported Groups in the Middle East and U.S. Policy

From Clayton Thomas comes this CRS report (updated 7 February 2024): 'Iran-Supported Groups in the Middle East and U.S. Policy'.

Download CRS_InFocus_Rpt_Iran-Supported_Groups_in_Middle_East_US_Policy_7Feb2024

Click on the graphic to enlarge it. 

Iran has long backed a network of armed groups in the Middle East to advance its regional interests. These groups, which include U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) and which sometimes style themselves the “Axis of Resistance,” have conducted attacks on U.S., Israeli, and other targets for years. The number, pace, and scope of such attacks have surged since the October 7, 2023, Hamas-led assault on Israel from Gaza and in the context of the subsequent Israel-Hamas war.

The escalation of those attacks (including a January 2024 Iraqi militia attack that killed three U.S. servicemembers in Jordan) elevates the risk that these groups might trigger the direct U.S.-Iran military confrontation that both countries’ governments say they seek to avoid. U.S. policymakers may evaluate various means of deterring and responding to such attacks (such as diplomacy and/or military strikes, whether on militia groups, Iranian personnel abroad, or inside Iran), and potential benefits, costs, and unintended consequences of these options.

Iran’s Foreign Policy
Support for regional nonstate actors has been a pillar of the Iranian government’s foreign policy since the 1979 founding of the Islamic Republic. Iran supports these groups to advance its foreign policy aims, including to position itself as the defender of Shia Muslim communities and other groups that the Iranian government characterizes as oppressed, such as the Palestinians. Perhaps preeminent among these aims is reducing threats that Iran may face stemming from the regional influence of the United States and its regional allies, with which the Iranian government “sees itself as locked in an existential struggle,” according to a public assessment by the U.S. intelligence community.

Support for these groups carries strategic benefits and risks for Iran. Iranian leaders might see supporting armed groups as a cost-effective way to project power, given that Iran lacks some key conventional military capabilities. Sponsorship of actors abroad could also deter potentially regime-destabilizing attacks on Iran itself, as part of what some Iran experts call a “forward defense” strategy. The sometimes-opaque nature of Iranian support for these groups may allow Iran to seek to deny its responsibility for its beneficiaries’ actions. At the same time, the United States and others may still seek to hold Iran accountable, including for actions that Iran may not have specifically directed or approved in advance. The Qods Force (QF) of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) coordinates Iranian support to armed groups abroad; both the IRGC and IRGC-QF are designated for U.S. sanctions under terrorism-related authorities.

Selected Iran-Backed Groups
According to U.S. officials, the groups profiled below are prominent beneficiaries of Iranian government support. The nature and degree of Iranian support vary: while all share some key interests with Tehran, to differing extents they also may act independently in pursuit of their own interests.

Lebanese Hezbollah
Arguably the most powerful Iranian-backed group and a key player in Lebanese politics, Hezbollah (“Party of God,” alt. Hizballah) most closely represents an Iranian proxy, in the sense of aligning directly with, and acting on behalf of, Tehran. Founded in the context of the Lebanese civil war and Israeli invasion, Hezbollah was established in 1982 by Lebanese Shia militants who were inspired by, and received critical assistance from, the new Islamic Republic of Iran. Per the State Department, Iran “continues to provide Hizballah with most of its funding, training, weapons, and explosives, as well as political, diplomatic, monetary, and organizational aid.” Hezbollah attacked U.S. targets in Lebanon during the country’s civil war, and has since targeted Israeli and Jewish targets in several countries.

Hezbollah and Israel (which fought an inconclusive 34-day war in 2006) have periodically exchanged fire across Israel’s northern border since October 2023, raising fears of a broader escalation in which Hezbollah’s arsenal of some 150,000 missiles and rockets could threaten Israeli strategic sites and population centers. Israeli officials have threatened wider military action in Lebanon if Hezbollah does not withdraw from the border to permit tens of thousands of evacuated Israelis to return to their homes; Hezbollah has insisted that Israel first halt fighting in Gaza. Hezbollah has not attacked U.S. forces in the context of ongoing regional tension. Hezbollah has reportedly provided support to many of the groups below, including Hamas and the Houthis.

Hamas
Iran has backed the Sunni Islamist Palestinian group Hamas for decades, going back nearly to the group’s inception in the late 1980s. Since Hamas took de facto control of the Gaza Strip in 2007, it has engaged in several rounds of conflict with Israel, with continued material and financial support from Iran. The State Department assesses that Iran provides “up to $100 million annually in combined support to Palestinian terrorist groups, including Hamas.” Hamas has reportedly received additional material support from private entities in other regional countries, and has also secured resources via its governance of Gaza.

U.S. officials have stated publicly that they do not have evidence that Iran played a direct role in planning or carrying out the October 7 assault. Still, the Biden Administration contends that Iran is “broadly complicit in these attacks,” as Hamas’s “primary backer for decades.” Media accounts, citing unnamed U.S. and other officials, have differed in their assessments, with some indicating that Tehran may have been surprised by the attacks.

The Houthis
The Iranian government has long backed the Yemeni Shia militant group Ansar Allah, aka the Houthi movement, and has increased its support since the Houthis took control of Yemen’s capital and much of the north in 2014-2015. Iran’s support to the Houthis—including ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as unmanned weapons systems—has reportedly enabled the group to attack the territories of U.S. partner states, including Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

The Houthis have espoused categorically anti-Israel views for decades, and since October 2023 have claimed several missile attacks against Israel, with many intercepted by Israeli or U.S. forces. The Houthis assert that they are demonstrating solidarity with the Palestinians by conducting attacks on commercial and naval vessels in the Red Sea since November 2023. These attacks have compelled many international shipping companies to abandon that waterway in favor of lengthier, costlier routes. The United States has deployed military assets to the region to respond to the Houthi attacks, thwarting Houthi hijackings of commercial vessels and exchanging fire with Houthi forces. A series of U.S. airstrikes since January 11, 2024, opened what U.S. officials reportedly foresee as a potentially sustained campaign to degrade Houthi capabilities, with likely implications for U.S.-backed efforts to end the civil war and meet humanitarian needs in Yemen.

Iraqi Militias
Iran has deeply rooted ties in neighboring Iraq, where it backs a number of powerful military and political groups, mostly from Iraq’s Shia majority. These groups gained combat experience and deepened their ties with Iran during operations against the Islamic State (IS) starting in 2014, and have leveraged that experience to become prominent actors in Iraq’s political system. Since 2017, Iran-backed Iraqi groups have conducted attacks against U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria, to which the United States has periodically responded with airstrikes. U.S.-designated FTOs in Iraq linked to such attacks include Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH), Harakat al Nujaba (HN), and Asa’ib Ahl al Haq (AAH). Attacks by those groups on U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria have multiplied since October 2023, prompting U.S. strikes, including a January 2024 airstrike in Baghdad that killed a senior HN leader. In response, the Iraqi government has sought to end the U.S.-led counter-IS coalition presence in the country, with potential implications for U.S. counter-IS operations in Syria. In January 2024, an attack claimed by Iran-backed Iraqi militants killed 3 U.S. servicemembers at a base in Jordan, the first U.S. military fatalities from strikes in the region after October 2023.

U.S. Policy
The Biden Administration has sought to deter and respond to potentially escalatory attacks from Iran-backed groups, while also avoiding the regionalization of the Israel-Hamas war beyond Gaza. Iranian officials have stated support for attacks as a means of ending the war in Gaza, while denying that they control the groups carrying out those attacks. Officials from each country have stated that private messages have been relayed to the other regarding an intention to avoid wider war.

Some Members of Congress have supported the Administration’s actions to date. Others have called for direct U.S. strikes on Iran, claiming that operations elsewhere do not deter Iran or the groups it supports. Others assert that the Administration lacks congressional authorization for U.S. forces to target Iran-backed groups.

The U.S. military has struck Iranian assets and personnel abroad (e.g., the 2020 strike that killed then-IRGC-QF commander Qasem Soleimani) but has not claimed any strikes within Iran. A broader military conflict with Iran could entail major costs for the United States, and may cause Iran to accelerate its nuclear activities or target U.S. forces and/or partners.

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