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USGAO Report: 'Hanford Cleanup - DOE Should Take Actions to Improve Inspections and Oversight of Contaminated Excess Facilities'

This report was just released to the pubic on 20 February 2020: Hanford Cleanup: DOE Should Take Actions to Improve Inspections and Oversight of Contaminated Excess Facilities.

Download GAO_Hanford_Full_Report_20Feb2020

Download GAO_Hanford_Highlights_20Feb2020

Maria Gibson and I just finished a project up there but it was unrelated to the waste issues per se. She did her usual excellent job.

Fast Facts
Nuclear facilities that are no longer used await cleanup at the Department of Energy’s site in Hanford, WA. Contractors inspect and maintain these facilities, but DOE hasn’t ensured that these activities fully meet requirements. For example, structural conditions are unknown in parts of a facility that inspectors haven’t entered in 50 years.

In 2017, workers found a partial roof collapse in a storage tunnel. DOE evaluated physical causes, but did not examine all inspection and maintenance practices that may have contributed to the accident. We recommended doing so and taking steps to improve inspections and maintenance.

Hanford Plutonium Uranium Extraction Plant (PUREX) and Storage Tunnels

What GAO Found
The Department of Energy (DOE) has taken some actions to evaluate the physical causes that contributed to the May 2017 partial collapse of the Plutonium Uranium Extraction (PUREX) Tunnel 1, but has not determined the programmatic causes that led to the collapse, such as by completing an accident investigation or a root cause analysis, among other things. For example, although an engineering evaluation of the tunnels was completed at the request of the State of Washington, Richland Operations Office (RL) officials told GAO an accident investigation was not initiated because the event did not meet threshold requirements in a DOE order that includes, among other things, damages or costs exceeding $2.5 million. However, GAO's analysis shows that the costs of responding to the event and stabilizing the tunnel were about $10 million. At the contractor's request, RL also waived performance of a root cause analysis, which DOE guidance states is typically required for such a significant event, and agreed to a less rigorous analysis of the potential physical causes of the event. By conducting a root cause analysis to determine any programmatic weaknesses that contributed to the collapse of PUREX Tunnel 1, and taking action to address any identified weaknesses, DOE will have greater assurance that another, similar event will not take place.  According to a DOE report and GAO's review, although the Hanford contractor is generally conducting routine surveillance inspections of contaminated excess facilities, these inspections have weaknesses and GAO found that DOE has not ensured requirements are fully met. Specifically, DOE orders require that processes be in place to ensure that inspections are conducted to detect deterioration and determine whether the structural integrity of facilities is threatened. A December 2017 DOE report and GAO's review found that the surveillance and maintenance (S&M) inspections at several facilities were not comprehensive and that there are areas of some facilities that personnel infrequently or never enter—physically or by remote means—to conduct inspections. For example, parts of the Reduction-Oxidation Facility have not been entered in more than 50 years and structural conditions are unknown. Without conducting comprehensive inspections, RL cannot ensure that it is meeting all of DOE's S&M requirements, such as addressing aging degradation and obsolescence of some facilities, and preventing other potential events similar to the PUREX tunnel collapse.

In addition, GAO's review of oversight reports since 2013 by DOE headquarters offices responsible for evaluating field office operations found that none of these assessments focused on RL's management and oversight of the contractor's S&M activities. DOE's Oversight Policy requires DOE to conduct independent oversight to the extent necessary to evaluate the effectiveness of DOE field office oversight of contractor activities. Without conducting periodic assessments or audits focused on RL's management and oversight of the contractor's S&M activities for contaminated excess facilities, DOE does not have assurance that RL is overseeing S&M activity in a way that ensures these facilities are inspected and maintained in a safe and compliant condition pending final cleanup.

Why GAO Did This Study
DOE's Hanford site in Washington State contains thousands of contaminated excess facilities and waste sites that remain to be cleaned up. In May 2017, a partial roof collapse at a waste storage tunnel facility for one of the former plutonium nuclear processing plants raised questions about the S&M of Hanford's excess facilities and how RL prioritizes cleanup of these facilities.

GAO was asked to review DOE's cleanup of Hanford's contaminated excess facilities, including how DOE ensures that the Hanford Site contractor inspects and maintains facilities. This report examines, among other things, (1) DOE's actions to evaluate the causes of the PUREX tunnel collapse, and (2) the extent to which DOE ensures that S&M of Hanford's contaminate excess facilities meet DOE requirements.

GAO reviewed DOE documents, administered a questionnaire to collect S&M information about 18 selected facilities representing the majority of the Hanford facilities cleanup effort, conducted in-depth reviews of selected Hanford facilities, and interviewed DOE and Hanford cleanup contractor officials.

Recommendations
GAO recommends that DOE (1) analyze the programmatic root causes of the tunnel collapse, (2) routinely conduct comprehensive inspections of contaminated excess facilities and take timely action as warranted, and (3) assess RL oversight of S&M of Hanford excess facilities. DOE agreed with GAO's recommendations and stated that it is taking steps to implement all of them by December 2020.

Recommendations for Executive Action

Other	The Assistant Secretary of DOE's Office of Environmental Management should direct RL to conduct a root cause analysis to identify any programmatic causes that may have led to the collapse of PUREX Tunnel 1. (Recommendation 1)	Open   When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Other	The Assistant Secretary of DOE's Office of Environmental Management, while ensuring the protection of DOE workers, the public, and the environment, should ensure that RL directs the Hanford Site cleanup contractor to explore using robotic or other means to routinely complete comprehensive surveillance inspections of contaminated excess facilities to identify aging degradation and obsolescence of facilities and take timely action as warranted. (Recommendation 2)	Open   When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Office of the Secretary	The Secretary of Energy should ensure DOE headquarters offices responsible for the oversight of EM sites' field offices conduct an assessment of RL's management and oversight of the Hanford Site contractor's surveillance and maintenance activity for contaminated excess facilities. Based on the results of this assessment, DOE headquarters offices should consider whether such assessments should be conducted on a periodic basis. (Recommendation 3)	Open   When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

 

Enjoy!

"A fact is a simple statement that everyone believes. It is innocent, unless found guilty. A hypothesis is a novel suggestion that no one wants to believe. It is guilty until found effective." - Edward Teller

M. Gibson and M. Campana AWRA MAR Presentations: 1) 'Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis and System Dynamics Model...Yakima Basin' 2) Harvesting Glacial Meltwater...with MAR'

1) M. Gibson and M. Campana. Abstract: page 11

Download 2019 AC Abstracts_FINAL

PDF (36 MB) of PPT: Download AWRA_SLC_GIBSON

2) M. Campana and M. Gibson  Abstract: page 14

Download 2019 AC Abstracts_FINAL

PDF of PPT: (14 MB) Download AWRA_SLC_CAMPANA

Download AWRA_SLC_CAMPANA

Enjoy! We did!

"The science of hydrology would be relatively simple if water were unable to penetrate below the earth's surface." - Harold E. Thomas (via groundwater geek)

CRS Report: 'Columbia River Treaty Review' (Updated 21 June 2019)

It is time for an updated (21 June 2019) CRS report by Charles V. Stern is all that in spades: Columbia River Treaty Review, released on 1 June 2018. The US and Canada are involved in a review of the Columbia River Treaty (CRT) and this document provides an excellent updated review of the issues. There is a lot of misinformation about the treaty, and this report will elucidate the facts and issues.

Download CRS_Report_Columbia_River_Trety_Review_21June 2019

Summary
The Columbia River Treaty (CRT, or Treaty) is an international agreement between the United States and Canada for the cooperative development and operation of the water resources of the Columbia River Basin to provide for flood control and power. The Treaty was the result of more than 20 years of negotiations between the two countries and was ratified in 1961. Implementation began in 1964.

The Treaty provided for the construction and operation of three dams in Canada and one dam in the United States whose reservoir extends into Canada. Together, these dams more than doubled the amount of reservoir storage available in the basin and provided significant flood protection benefits. In exchange for these benefits, the United States agreed to provide Canada with lump- sum cash payments and a portion of downstream hydropower benefits that are attributable to Canadian operations under the CRT, known as the “Canadian Entitlement.” Some have estimated the Canadian Entitlement to be worth as much as $335 million annually.

The CRT has no specific end date, and most of its provisions would continue indefinitely without action by the United States or Canada. Currently, either the United States or Canada can terminate most provisions of the CRT with a minimum of 10 years’ written notice. To date, neither country has given notice of termination, but both countries have indicated a preliminary interest in modification of the treaty. If the CRT is not terminated or modified, most of its provisions would continue, with the exception of its flood control provisions (which are scheduled to transition automatically to “called-upon” operations at that time, meaning the United States would request and compensate Canada for flood control operations as necessary).

Perspectives on the CRT and its review vary. Some believe the Treaty should include stronger provisions related to tribal resources and flows for fisheries that are not in the Treaty; others disagree and focus on the perceived need to adjust the Canadian Entitlement to reflect actual hydropower benefits. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Bonneville Power Administration, in their joint role as the U.S. Entity overseeing the Treaty, undertook a review of the CRT from 2009 to 2013. Based on studies and stakeholder input, they provided a Regional Recommendation to the State Department in December 2013. They recommended continuing the Treaty with certain modifications, including rebalancing the CRT’s hydropower provisions, further delineating called-upon flood control operations after 2024, and incorporating into the Treaty flows to benefit Columbia River fisheries. For its part, the Canadian Entity (the Province of British Columbia) released in March 2013 a recommendation to continue the CRT with modifications “within the Treaty framework.” It disputed several assumptions in the U.S. Entity’s review process.

Following a two-year federal interagency review of the U.S. Regional Recommendation, the U.S. State Department finalized its negotiating parameters and authorized talks with Canada in October 2016. Between May 2018 and May 2019, U.S. and Canadian negotiating teams held six rounds of negotiations. Additional negotiations are expected in 2019.

If the executive branch comes to an agreement regarding modification of the CRT, the Senate may be asked to weigh in on future versions of the Treaty pursuant to its constitutional role to provide advice and consent. Both houses have also weighed in on CRT-related activities through their oversight roles.

“Patience, time and money accommodate all things.” – Spanish Proverb (tnx @AnnaWSears)

CRS Report: 'Columbia River Treaty Review' (Updated 21 May 2019) Do We Need a Compact Too?

This CRS report was updated by Charles V. Stern on 21 May 2019: Columbia River Treaty Review. 

Download CRS_Columbia_River_Treaty_Rev_21May2019

Summary
The Columbia River Treaty (CRT, or Treaty) is an international agreement between the United States and Canada for the cooperative development and operation of the water resources of the Columbia River Basin to provide for flood control and power. The Treaty was the result of more than 20 years of negotiations between the two countries and was ratified in 1961. Implementation began in 1964.

The Treaty provided for the construction and operation of three dams in Canada and one dam in the United States whose reservoir extends into Canada. Together, these dams more than doubled the amount of reservoir storage available in the basin and provided significant flood protection benefits. In exchange for these benefits, the United States agreed to provide Canada with lump- sum cash payments and a portion of downstream hydropower benefits that are attributable to Canadian operations under the CRT, known as the “Canadian Entitlement.” Some have estimated the Canadian Entitlement to be worth as much as $335 million annually.

The CRT has no specific end date, and most of its provisions would continue indefinitely without action by the United States or Canada. Beginning in September 2024, either nation can terminate most provisions of the Treaty with at least 10 years’ written notice (i.e., starting as early as 2014). To date, neither country has given notice of termination, but both countries have indicated a preliminary interest in modification of the treaty. If the CRT is not terminated or modified, most of its provisions would continue, with the exception of its flood control provisions (which are scheduled to transition automatically to “called-upon” operations at that time, meaning the United States would request and compensate Canada for flood control operations as necessary).

Perspectives on the CRT and its review vary. Some believe the Treaty should include stronger provisions related to tribal resources and flows for fisheries that are not in the Treaty; others disagree and focus on the perceived need to adjust the Canadian Entitlement to reflect actual hydropower benefits. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Bonneville Power Administration, in their joint role as the U.S. Entity overseeing the Treaty, undertook a review of the CRT from 2009 to 2013. Based on studies and stakeholder input, they provided a Regional Recommendation to the State Department in December 2013. They recommended continuing the Treaty with certain modifications, including rebalancing the CRT’s hydropower provisions, further delineating called-upon flood control operations after 2024, and incorporating into the Treaty flows to benefit Columbia River fisheries. For its part, the Canadian Entity (the Province of British Columbia) released in March 2013 a recommendation to continue the CRT with modifications “within the Treaty framework.” It disputed several assumptions in the U.S. Entity’s review process.

Following a two-year federal interagency review of the U.S. Regional Recommendation, the U.S. State Department finalized its negotiating parameters and authorized talks with Canada in October 2016. Between May 2018 and May 2019, U.S. and Canadian negotiating teams held six rounds of negotiations. Additional negotiations are expected in 2019.

If the executive branch comes to an agreement regarding modification of the CRT, the Senate may be asked to weigh in on future versions of the Treaty pursuant to its constitutional role to provide advice and consent. Both houses have also weighed in on CRT-related activities through their oversight roles.

Cutting to the chase...

The Role of Congress in Treaty Review
The President, through the National Security Council, determines the negotiating position on the CRT, and the State Department is responsible for conducting negotiations related to the Treaty. However, Congress is also involved in this process. The Constitution gives the Senate the power to approve, by a two-thirds vote, treaties negotiated by the executive branch.53 The Senate does

not ratify treaties; instead it takes up a resolution of ratification, by which the Senate may formally provide its advice and consent on the ratification process. The Senate is not required to provide an up or down vote on a resolution of ratification, nor are treaties required to be resubmitted after each Congress.

In the case of the CRT, as the Treaty has been previously negotiated and ratified, the Senate would take up a resolution of ratification if the United States and Canada agree to Treaty modifications and the executive branch submits the modification to the Senate for review (if the Treaty is continued without modification or terminated, there would be no advice and consent role unless there was a new Treaty that needs to be ratified).

Both the House and the Senate have also weighed in on Treaty review in their oversight capacities. Additionally, the Northwest delegation (including all 26 lawmakers representing Idaho, Montana, Oregon, and Washington) sent letters to President Obama in 2014 and 2015 expressing concerns with the perceived slow pace of the Interagency Policy Committee review process. In April 2015, lawmakers expressed a collective desire to finalize an Administration position and begin negotiations with Canada in 2015. On June 21, 2017, a bipartisan group of seven House Members from Washington and Oregon wrote to President Trump requesting prompt commencement of CRT negotiations.

My sense, and this is mainly just a gut feeling, is that Canadian stakeholders have had more input than US ones. I have friends on both sides of the border.

Do We Need a Compact for the Snake-Columbia Basin?
Okay - this is a separate issue from the CRT.

It's surprising to me that the there is no compact among the US Columbia River basin states. As someone who cut his teeth on water issues in Arizona, Nevada, and New Mexico (all Colorado River Compact states) and seeing Colorado, New Mexico and Texas battle over the Rio Grande,. I have seen the utiiity of compacts. When I arrived in Oregon in 2006 I was surprised to find that there was no compact among the Columbia River (or Columbia-Snake Basin - CSB) states of Oregon, Washington, Idaho (the big three), Montana, Wyoming, Utah and Nevada. Furthermore, the seemed to be little concern over this. Read on...

I wrote a bunch on this topic in 2013. I will repost it here.

In 2006, when I arrived in Oregon from New Mexico, I was quite surprsied to learn that the Columbia-Snake Basin (CSB) did not have a compact. Keep in mind that I learned my water in the arid Southwest: AZ, NM, and NV. Hard to imagine places much drier than those three states, where I would joke that any interstate perennial waterway that can allow two minnows to swim side-by-side probably has a compact governing water allocation. Well, maybe not, but rivers like the Colorado, Rio Grande, Pecos, Truckee, et al., none of which comes close to matching the flow of the CSB, all have compacts.

Therein lies the issue: the CSB produces so much water - the mean annual flow of the Columbia at its mouth is about 200 MAF (about 7800 cms) - that people don't seem to worry about allocation among the states. When talking to PNW WaterWonks (or Water Buffaloes) I get four reasons why a CSB compact is unnecessary:

1) there's plenty of water for all;
2) all the states pretty much get along when it comes to water;
3) a compact might sour relations among the seven states; and
4) too many stakeholders would have to be involved.  

The last reason reminds me of the 'old days' when you had irrigators, hydropower/flood control people and water supply-types calling the shots. Today, you'd need those pesky enviros, tribes, watershed council types, tribes - all those folks. Gees, what mess - you'd have to rent the Rose Garden to have a stakeholders' meeting!

The first two reasons are interesting. Sure, we generally have enough water and the states do seem to get along when it comes to water. Try Texas and New Mexico!

The third reason might be valid. whenever you have a formal agreement, you have lawyers. No more settling disputes over lunch or breakfast. Litigation, anyone?  

But the reason I think we need a compact is the future. Things might be fine now, water-wise, but what about the effects of climate change on water supply? We are already seeing those effects. Without an agreement now, when things are relatively tranquil, what would it be like to have to devise a compact when times are tough, water is short and more people are present? And forget about fighting amongst yourselves; you might want some protection from outsiders' depredations (think Great Lakes Compact). You want ugly?

And imagine a compact with Nevada - yes, it is in the CSB - with water-hungry Las Vegas. Interesting... 

I have heard that in the last 20-30 years an attempt was made to craft a compact; it obviously failed.

Believe me, I am not underestimating how difficult it would be to develop a compact. A daunting task - getting seven states to agree on water allocation, environmental flows, etc. - say what? But creating a flexible, adaptive, binding document to ensure a relatvely peaceful, secure water future for the states of the Columbia-Snake basin is well worth it.

Handshake agreements may be nice, but when the 'old hands' are gone, nothing beats a legally binding document.

Not much has happened since then to change my thinking. If anything, I am more convinced now than then. I suspect agreeing on a CSB compact would be much harder that negotiating the CRT. It will get harder as time goes by.

Enjoy! 

"Life is like a sewer. What you get out of it depends upon what you put into it." - Tom Lehrer (quoted in @Forbesvia@TheWeek)

Lane Community College's Online Water Conservation Technician Program - Fall 2019 Apps Accepted

Brenda Cervantes of Lane Community College in Eugene, OR, sent me this information on LCC's new online Water Conservation Technician program. It's funded by the National Science Foundation.

Here is the blurb from the website:

The Water Conservation Technician program consists of an inspiring community of students and faculty dedicated to improving community water security and quality using ecologically sustainable practices. Through the two-year Water Conservation Technician online program, you will be prepared for the growing field of Water Conservation and the challenges a shortage of water will bring. 

The Program trains individuals to evaluate water use patterns; develop, implement, market and maintain conservation programs; perform public outreach; recommend water efficiency techniques; integrate alternative water sources, and perform systems analysis to solve problems.

As water-related issues continue to increase, more voluntary and mandatory water conservation opportunities are being created that require a technical skill set like that which is offered within this program. Employment opportunities in Water Conservation are excellent. Students must consider the Western United States when seeking employment as those willing to relocate will have greater employment opportunities. 

What's the starting pay?

• Oregon state wages range from $32,000 to $48,500  annually plus benefits. Wages will vary in other states.

Prepare for a career in the water field as water efficiency technicians, coordinators, or specialists, or as water management specialists and technicians. The program prepares students to design, implement and evaluate water conservation programs.

For more information on the two-year degree programs and training for water professionals contact Roger Ebbage, ebbager@lanecc.edu or (541) 463-6160. 

The fall term starts on 30 September 2019. Admissions close one week before that date. The program does have requirements that must be satisfied before admission so check with Roger. 

Here is a video:

Information from an alternate site - the Northwest Water and Energy Institute at LCC:

Graduates Of The Program Are Able To

• Design, implement, evaluate, and market water conservation programs to a broad audience
• Evaluate water usage patterns for rural, urban, residential, and commercial sites; recommend efficiency measures as well as alternate water sources.
• Understand water distribution, flow, and elimination systems; basic hydraulics; quality issues; balance and time of use.
• Understand the many stressors to water accessibility and how they interact to affect supply and demand along with other issues.
• Monitor, collect, interpret and analyze data to evaluate effectiveness of programs and modify them over time.
• Calculate water and cost savings and produce comprehensive cost/benefit analysis reports.

Some relevant job titles are:

• Water Conservation - Program Specialist, Manager

• Water Resource - Analyst, Specialist

• Rainwater Harvesting Tech

• Stormwater - Coordinator, Technician

• Wastewater - Manager, Stores Supervisor, Program Analyst

• Conservation Warden

• Stewardship Coordinator

Looks awfully good. Glad to see such a broad approach. Apply for Fall 2019 now!

Enjoy!

"The purpose of education is not to make men carpenters, but to make carpenters men." -- W.E.B. Du Bois